- Introduction and background
- Part 1: Legal frameworks
- Part 2: Policies and procedures
- Part 3: Comparative indicators
- Summary and recommendations
- References and data sources
Introduction
Reporting period: 2019
Report author(s): Alejandra Mohor and Nicolás Bravo (Centro de Estudios en Seguridad Ciudadana, University of Chile), with collaboration from Javier Velázque
Summary: Chile has made significant progress over the past 10 years in regulating the use of force by law enforcement officers. A pending task is a regulation with the status of law and scope over all LEAs, which includes strengthening the registration and internal control over the use of force, creating external civilian controls and providing strategies for the prevention of the improper use of force.
Abstract
The limitations in institutional data on the use of firearms prevent exhaustive reporting of their effect. Only the Carabineros keeps a (limited) record of civilians and police officers injured and killed by firearms; the Investigative Police PDI does not have records; and the information related to the intervention of the Armed Forces in public order tasks does not report information based on defense regulations. There is no homogeneous legal obligation regarding information, since there is no law regulating the use of lethal force for all LEAs.
In 2019, based on press data, 21 people were killed by firearm fired by LEAs; that year, no LEA in service was killed by firearm.
Background
In Chile, there are two police institutions: (i) Carabineros de Chile, with tasks associated with crime prevention, crime investigation, and control of public order; and (ii) the Investigative Police (PDI), which is dedicated mainly to criminal investigation with functions in the field of migration and international police. Both are enshrined in the Political Constitution of the Republic of 1980 and have their respective constitutional organic laws that regulate their internal functioning. Both police forces are attached to the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, and both have jurisdiction over the entire national territory within the scope of their functions. With regard to criminal investigation, a function they, it is the prosecutor of the case who determines which of them will carry out each crime investigation.
The Carabineros is a militarized institution created in 1927, structured around two differentiated scales: Institutional Appointments (Nombramiento Institucional), who are trained at the Escuela de Carabineros for two years, and can reach the non-commissioned officer rank of Major; and Supreme Appointments (Nombramiento Supremo), who enter the Escuela de Oficiales for four years and can reach the rank of General. The PDI for its part is a civil police force founded in 1933 and has a single scale, although it has a temporary (non-permanent) entry mechanism for professionals. Training is carried out exclusively at the Escuela de Investigaciones for four years. As of December 2022, the Carabineros had a staff of 49,766 police agents and officers, while the PDI had 8,611 police officers.
Part 1: Legal Frameworks
Global treaties
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) | State party | |
ICCPR Optional Protocol 1 | State party | |
1984 Convention Against Torture (CAT) | State party | |
CAT committee competent to receive individual complaints? | Yes | |
CAT Optional Protocol 1 | State party |
Regional treaties
1969 Inter-American Convention on Human Rights | State party | |
1985 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture | State party |
National legal provisions
Relevant constitutional provisions or general laws
- Political Constitution of the Republic, Article 101, Paragraph 2
- “The Public Order and Security Forces are composed only of Carabineros and Investigaciones. They constitute the public force and exist to give effectiveness to the law, guarantee public order and internal public security.”
- Law 17.798, on arms control. Article 3, Paragraph 3
- Exempts the Carabineros de Chile and Investigaciones de Chile, among other State institutions, from the prohibition of firearms possession.
COROLLARY: Carabineros and the Investigative Police, as ‘Public Order and Security Forces’, are the Chilean law enforcement agencies. In this role, they have the power to use force and, in its exercise, they are authorized to use lethal weapons (firearms). - Code of Military Justice (applies to Carabineros de Chile), Articles 208 and 410
- The use of arms in self-defense or in the immediate defense of a stranger to whom, by reason of their position, they must provide protection or assistance; when there is no other rational means to achieve it.
- Penal Code (applies in a supplementary manner), Article 10, Parts 4 and 6
- The person who acts in defense of his person or rights, or of the person and rights of a stranger, is exempt from criminal responsibility, provided that there is an unlawful aggression, the rational necessity of the means used to prevent or repel it and the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
COROLLARY: Police officers —in a generic sense— are exempt from criminal liability when, in self-defense or in defense of a third party, they use their weapons, provided it is an unlawful aggression, there is no other rational means to prevent or repel it, and it is not attributable to their provocation.
Relevant specific national legislation
- Law 21560 (April, 2023)
- Amends the Codes of Military Justice, Criminal Procedure, Penal, and the organic laws of the Carabineros de Chile; Investigative Police and Gendarmerie of Chile, among other legal texts, in order to strengthen and protect the exercise of the police and gendarmerie functions of Chile.
- General Order 2870 (September 8, 2021)
- Updates part of those Carabineros protocols, on international human rights standards applicable to the police function; basic concepts about police action and the right of assembly; and intervention techniques in public meetings or social demonstrations for the maintenance and restoration of public order
- General Order 2635 (March 1, 2019)
- Applies international guidelines on the use of force to Carabineros operations in safeguarding public order, through protocols of a practical nature.
- Circular 1832 (March 1, 2019)
- Establishes general principles and imparts technical instructions regarding the use of force, with special emphasis on the use of lethal and potentially lethal weapons.
- General Order 2615 (October 2, 2019)
- Regulates the use of force by the PDI, also assimilating international guidelines and seeking to operationalize the general principles.
- General Order 918 (January 8, 1988)
- Enables the PDI to possess firearms, regulating their control, carrying and use in the context of the fulfilment of the PDI’s institutional duties.
- Supreme Decree 1364 (November 13, 2018)
- Establishes guidelines for the use of force in safeguarding public order and a biannual report with statistical information on use of force incidents.
Relevant national regulations
- Law 18.961 (February 27, 1990) and Decree Law 2460 (January 9, 1979)
- Organic Laws of the Carabineros de Chile and the Investigative Police of Chile, respectively. Both enable the personnel of each institution to use firearms, in compliance with the law in force and in the performance of their role.
- Decree Law 3.356 (April 30, 1980 – last version December 5, 1989)
- Enables retired personnel (General Officers, Superior Officers, Lieutenant Colonels, or equivalent, and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers of the Armed Forces and Carabineros) to carry arms, as long as they still have a valid Institutional Identify Card.
- General Order 2125 (October 2, 2012) and General Order 2490 (May 11, 2017)
- Establish technical manuals for Carabineros operations in safeguarding public order, with a human rights approach and a practical translation of general principles and international standards.
- General Order 2478 (March 27, 2017) and General Order 2186 (May 20, 2008)
- Establish the guiding principles of the ethics of each institution, respectively, and of the police function, in general.
Legal interpretation and application
UN or other international body decisions or advisory opinions
- Report on the mission to Chile by a team from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, December 13, 2019
- Following the protests and social commotion in Chile during the series of disturbances known as the ‘social outburst’ (estallido social), this visit was scheduled to assess the human rights situation, in general, and to identify the main patterns of human rights violations committed as well as to analyze the institutional response to the protests, and make recommendations to the Chilean State, specifically. The Commission concluded that a large number of human rights violations were committed, largely due to the excessive and unnecessary use of force (in breach of international norms and standards), which resulted in unlawful killings, torture and ill-treatment, as well as giving rise to acts of sexual violence.
- Report of the on-site visit to Chile to observe the human rights situation, by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, January 24, 2022
- The purpose of the visit was to observe on-site the human rights situation in the context of social protest since the beginning of the ‘social outburst’ (2019–2020), following an early warning of the excessive use of force and various forms of institutional violence. In closing, it made recommendations that, among other things, the necessary measures be taken to put an immediate end to the disproportionate use of force by the Carabineros de Chile in the context of social protests and to initiate the processing of a comprehensive reform of this institution, along with the establishment of an external control body for police actions.
- Report of the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Human Rights Council on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association following his mission to Chile of October 24, 2016
- He assessed the situation, in general, of the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association in the country and compliance with international standards on the use of force in these contexts. The Special Rapporteur identified, on the one hand, a series of good practices in the management of public meetings, but, on the other hand, identified some normative deficiencies, as well as certain (worrisome) operational problems; all of which led to recommendations for their prompt resolution.
- Sixth periodic report on Chile by the Committee Against Torture, dated August 28, 2018
- It identified positive aspects of the country’s respect for human rights but also expressed concern about a number of critical areas (about which it made recommendations) including: definition and criminalization of the crime of torture; national mechanism for the prevention of torture; police brutality and excessive use of force; allegations of police sexual violence against women and girls; investigation, prosecution and punishment of acts of torture and ill-treatment; deaths of minors and allegations of torture, ill-treatment and sexual abuse in residential protection centers of the National Service for Minors network; and torture and ill-treatment of persons with disabilities and the elderly.
- Seventh periodic report on Chile by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, March 14, 2018
- Among the forms of gender-based violence against women in Chile, it recognized excessive use of force and sexual violence by State agents against Mapuche women.
- Fourth and fifth periodic report on Chile by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, October 30, 2015
- It recognized with concern the multiplicity of cases of excessive use of force against students by security forces and the lack of standards, protocols and procedures specifying the maximum force that can be applied to adolescents who are deprived of liberty.
Regional court judgments
There are no judgements of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in this regard.
- Report No. 458/21 of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on case 12. 880: Edmundo Alex Lemún Saavedra et al. v. Chile, of December 31, 2021
- Urges the Chilean State to adopt measures of non-repetition that include legislative, administrative and any other measures with the purpose of: (i) preventing the excessive use of force by Carabineros in the context of the territorial claims of indigenous peoples, particularly the Mapuche people, including training, coordination and supervision measures, as well as the establishment of suitable mechanisms of accountability before the State and civil society; and (ii) ensuring that the military criminal justice system cannot, under any circumstances, hear cases of human rights violations.
National court judgments
- RIT 305-2019, Fourth Oral Criminal Court of Santiago, case against Francisco Javier Arzola Ruiz and another, sentence of September 14th, 2019
- FACTS: Three civilians (street merchants) were on separate occasions brutally beaten and threatened with death by someone who called himself the ‘Paco Nazi’. SENTENCE: The then senior non-commissioned officer of the Carabineros, Francisco Arzola Ruiz, was sentenced to 17 years’ imprisonment for the crime of torment or unlawful coercion (Article 150A of the Penal Code) and of the consummated and reiterated crime of torture (Article 150A of the Penal Code), and the then First Corporal, Rodrigo Muñoz Cid, was also sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment for the crime of torture.
- Rol 788-2022, Court of Appeals of Antofagasta, case against José Andrés Cuevas Meliñir, judgment of September 28th, 2022
- FACTS: Eight civilians were detained by military officials and taken to an undetermined sector of the desert, where they were assaulted and threatened with death if they didn’t immediately get out of sight. Then, the agents left, leaving the civilians abandoned in the middle of the desert at night. JUDGMENT: The appeal against the judgment of the lower court sentencing Chilean Army officer Jose Cuevas Melinir to four years’ imprisonment for the crime of torture (Article 150A of the Penal Code) was rejected.
- Rol 80-2019, Oral Criminal Court of Angol, Camilo Catrillanca Marín case, judgment of January 28, 2021
- FACTS: Camilo Catrillanca and his 15-year-old friend with the initials M.A.P.C. were traveling on a tractor on a road in the Mapuche community of Temucuicui. Minutes before, in a nearby sector, a crime occurred that prompted an operation by the Special Police Operations Group (GOPE) of Carabineros. During the operation, Camilo Catrillanca was shot, which caused his instant death, and the minor M.A.P.C. was detained, suffering unlawful coercion. SENTENCE: The former Carabineros sergeant Carlos Alarcón Molina, was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment for the homicide of Camilo Catrillanca, and 5 years and one day for the attempted homicide of M.A.P.C. The former sergeant Raúl Ávila Morales, was sentenced to 3 years and one day in prison for the unlawful coercion of M.A.P.C.
- RIT 60-2022, Oral Criminal Court of San Bernardo, Fabiola Campillai Rojas case, sentence of October 11, 2022
- FACTS: While walking to work (and while demonstrations were taking place due to the social crisis) in San Bernardo, southern Santiago, Fabiola Campillai was struck in the face by a tear gas grenade fired by the former Carabineros officer Patricio Maturana Ojeda. This impact caused the victim to lose her sight, taste and sense of smell. SENTENCE: Patricio Maturana Ojeda was sentenced to 12 years and 183 days’ imprisonment for the crime of unlawful coercion resulting in very serious injuries (Articles 150 D and E of the Criminal Code).
Oversight bodies
- National Institute of Human Rights
- Established on June 15, 2005 by Law 20.405, its mission is to promote and protect the human rights of all persons living in Chile, established in constitutional and legal norms; in the international treaties signed and ratified by Chile and that are in force, as well as those arising from the general principles of law, recognized by the international community. In this mission, the law endows it with the prerogative to initiate legal actions before the ordinary courts of justice to clarify the criminal responsibility of public officials in cases where these rights have been violated.
- Committee for the Prevention of Torture
- Established on April 25, 2019 by Law 21.154, it is mandated to prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, through an operational system of visits, advice, training and advocacy. In this mission, the law endows it with the prerogative of supervising all places of deprivation of liberty in the country, to ensure respect for the human rights of the persons held there.
Part 2: Policies and Procedures
Data collection and publication by official agencies
1. Are the number of deaths following any police use of force | ||
Collected? | Partial, Medium | |
Accessible through existing publicly available information? | No Provisions | |
Is this a legal requirement? | Partial, Medium | |
Can such information be requested from the authorities when not publicly available? | Good, Robust | |
If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released? | Partial, Medium | |
2. If published, to what extent can the number of deaths be readily determined from official statistics? | No Provisions | |
3. Is it possible to identify specific individuals killed in official records? | No Provisions | |
4. Is demographic and other information for the deceased | ||
Collected? | Limited, Poor | |
Accessible through existing publicly available information? | No Provisions | |
Is this a legal requirement? | No Provisions | |
Can such information be requested from the authorities when not publicly available? | Good, Robust | |
If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released? | Limited, Poor | |
5. Is demographic and other information on officers in use of force incidents | ||
Collected? | Partial, Medium | |
Accessible through existing publicly available information? | Limited, Poor | |
Is this a legal requirement? | Limited, Poor | |
Can such information be requested from the authorities when not publicly available? | Good, Robust | |
If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released? | Partial, Medium | |
6. Is information on the circumstances | ||
Collected? | Limited, Poor | |
Publicly available? | No Provisions | |
Is this a legal requirement? | No Provisions | |
Can such information be requested from the authorities when not publicly available? | Good, Robust | |
If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released? | Limited, Poor | |
7. Is information about the type(s) of force used | ||
Collected? | Partial, Medium | |
Accessible through existing publicly available information? | No Provisions | |
Is this a legal requirement? | No Provisions | |
Can such information be requested from the authorities when not publicly available? | Good, Robust | |
If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released? | Partial, Medium |
Data quality of official sources
8. How reliable are the sources used to produce official statistics about deaths? | Unknown | |
9. Are there mechanisms for internal quality assurance / verification conducted | Unknown | |
10. Is the methodology for data collection publicised? | No Provisions | |
11. How reliable are the overall figures produced? | Limited, Poor |
Data analysis and lessons learnt
12. Do state or police agencies analyse data on the use of lethal force, to prevent future deaths? | Limited, Poor | |
13. Is there evidence that state/ police agencies act on the results of their analysis, including applying lessons learnt? | Partial, Medium | |
14. Are external bodies are able to reuse data for their own analyses? | No Provisions | |
15. Do external, non-governmental agencies collect and publish their own statistics on deaths following police use of force? | Partial, Medium |
Investigations by official agencies
16. Is there a legal requirement for deaths to be independently investigated? | Limited, Poor | |
19. Are close relatives of the victims involved in the investigations? | Good, Robust | |
20. Investigation reports into deaths | ||
Are publicly available? | No Provisions | |
Give reasons for the conclusions they have reached? | Good, Robust | |
Is this a legal requirement? | Good, Robust | |
Can such information be requested from the authorities when not publicly available? | Good, Robust | |
If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released? | Unknown | |
21. Is there information available on legal proceedings against agents / officials, pursuant to deaths? | No Provisions | |
22. Is there information available on legal proceedings against state agencies, pursuant to deaths? | No Provisions | |
23. Is there information available on disciplinary proceedings against agents/ officials, pursuant to deaths? | Limited, Poor | |
24. Number of prosecutions against agents / officials involved in the last ten years? | Data unavailable | |
25. Number of convictions against agents / officials involved in the last ten years? | Data unavailable | |
26. Number of prosecutions against agencies involved in the last ten years? | Data unavailable | |
27. Number of convictions against agencies involved in the last ten years? | Data unavailable | |
28. Number of cases in which states have been found to have breached human rights law on the use of lethal force? | Data unavailable |
Detailed elaboration
Data collection and publication by official agencies
Until 2011, Chilean police were under the control of the Ministry of Defense, and were covered by the Code of Military Justice. Since their transfer to the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security in 2010 (Law 20.502), a process of adaptation of internal regulations to international human rights standards and guidelines for law enforcement officials has been taking place, while specific exceptions have been established with respect to the jurisdiction of military justice over the police. Regulations subjecting police institutions to the Law of Transparency and Access to Public Information stand out. At the same time (influenced by the creation of the National Institute of Human Rights, its Report on Police and Human Rights and the Agreement on Compliance with Recommendations of Case 12.880, Edmundo Alex Lemún Saavedra v. Chile), the regulation of the use of force by Chilean police institutions has come under discussion. It was not until 2023 that the executive introduced a bill establishing the rules for the use of force for law enforcement officers. As of the date of this report (August 2023), the use of force in Chile is regulated only by infra-legal norms (general orders and institutional circulars).
It is from these milestones and instruments that the obligation of police institutions to keep records of the use of force and ‘violent episodes’ derives. Law 20.502 of 2010 establishes the power of the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security to require statistical information from the police. However, in 2018 it was specified the obligation to provide this information about cases related to the use of force (Decree 1364 of the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security1), but would be limited to the Carabineros de Chile, thus excluding the PDI. This decree obliges the Carabineros to report biannually, indicating that the data must be disaggregated according to territorial units (provinces and communes), excluding information on the demographic characterization of the victims and the facts surrounding the lethal events. Although this information is not made public through the mechanisms of active transparency, when requested through the Transparency Law, the institution reports it indicating date of occurrence, gender of the victim, commune and region of occurrence, both with respect to civilians killed and injured by the use of firearms.
Regarding the PDI, only the duty to report the use of ammunition on the occasion of a police proceeding has been found in Article 21 of General Order 918 of 1988, without specifying the creation of a statistical record from these reports. This general order is known by virtue of the institutional response to Oficio 42424 of October 2019 issued by the Chamber of Deputies to the PDI regarding the use of force2. The information produced by this registry is not publicly available, and when requested using the Transparency Law, it has been denied for constituting an undue distraction3.
When lethal incidents have taken place, they are referred to the Public Prosecutor’s Office for criminal investigation — like any other criminal act. Institutional information is recorded through the Prosecutor Assistance System (SAF). The SAF is not intended to generate statistical data and, therefore, even when it is used for these purposes, the completeness of relevant information on the use of lethal force by enforcement officers is insufficient and is not included in the statistics reported periodically by the institution4.
Although the National Institute of Human Rights does not specifically generate statistical data on all Carabineros and PDI actions, it is possible to know those events in which the institute has been constituted, either by direct observation or through complaints. This information can be seen for the year 2020 in the Human Rights Program Report on Police Function and Public Order5.
Data quality of official sources
Regarding deaths in general, in 2022 for the first time an institutional effort has been made to integrate sources of information (legal medicine, prosecutors, police), however, such efforts do not allow public verification of which of the deaths are the result of actions of police officers.
The reliability of official statistical information on deaths caused by police officers is poor. First, because it is partial (only the Carabineros produce this information); and second, because we have noticed inconsistency between the information provided by the Carabineros and that which can be identified in the review of press reports. The PDI have indicated that they do not have specific records on civilian deaths caused by their agents; nor do they have any records on the deaths of agents on duty.
Regarding deaths caused by the police, the internal mechanisms for verifying the quality of the information are unknown.
Data analysis and lessons learned
Part of what we know about data analysis and learned lessons is the result of human rights violations by the police in 2019. That year witnessed a high-profile case of police brutality against a group of protesters in southern Chile in 2012; namely, the use of rubber buckshot which caused several people to be injured with ocular trauma6. Internal documents indicated that Carabineros reacted by assessing the risk of such ammunitions and implementing new internal use of force procedures or guidelines. However, those changes were not communicated to the public as a part of evidence-based policing research studies. In any case, those lessons did not prevent the Carabineros using the same ammunition in 2019 and inflicting more than 400 cases of ocular traumas on protesters.
The Chilean Institute of Human Rights (INDH) has published reports on police conduct7, eventually including reporting on deaths. However, those reports have had limited use within the police. Nevertheless, police are often requested to seek the INDH’s advice when updating their use of force guidelines.
Regarding the analysis of information within police institutions, there are no known recommendations aimed at preventing future deaths. However, there have been few research studies in this regard. The most successful one so far is the Chilean chapter of the Lethal Force Monitor8.
Investigations by official agencies
In Chile, the prosecution (Ministerio Público/Fiscalía de Chile) oversees and manages criminal complaint investigations. It means that the prosecutor coordinates with the police and instructs them to investigate. However, any action during the investigation (such as collecting evidence, interviewing witnesses, analyzing evidence in laboratories) is carried out by one of the two police institutions. In some cases, particularly with special victims, the prosecution themselves carry out the investigation, interviewing victims, witnesses and suspects. In this regard, this is a different paradigm, unlike those countries in which police carry out the criminal investigation themselves. After they finish it, they inform the prosecution of the results of it.
Which police institution carries out a specific investigation is a decision of the prosecutor. In cases of death by police, it is possible to assign the investigation to the same institution involved as there is no legal regulation on this issue. Through a review of the press, it is possible to identify cases in which the official involved is investigated by the same institution to which (s)he belongs. As noted in one report:
On April 19, Corporal Jorge Ulloa shot Yefri Figueroa in the head. The policeman said that the young man tried to assault him and the SIP [police investigation section] of his own unit investigated him, without questioning the version. A complaint from the victim’s family activated the PDI [Policía de Investigaciones]: witnesses and wiretaps proved that the story was false9.
There is no public and systematic information regarding those investigations. Not even by Transparency Law is it possible to gain access to specific information regarding investigations involving police agents, because in the databases no label is used to indicate when police agents are defendants (or victims).
Once again, it is research journalism that allows the public to know information about how investigations of events involving the use of lethal force by the police are conducted. As summarized in one article:
This research compiled 12 cases, which occurred between 2017 and 2022, in which police officers used their service weapons when confronting criminals who had committed high-profile violent crimes (such as assaults, burglaries and lock-ups, among others), resulting in serious injuries or death of a criminal. In all of these cases, the officer was not arrested or formalized and the case was closed, with no judicial consequences for the carabinero, before reaching the oral trial stage10.
Legal proceedings, prosecutions and convictions
Carabineros de Chile themselves have indicated to the press, 30 cases between 2019 and 2023 in which Carabineros agents were charged for wounding people with their service weapon. For those, ultimately seven agents convicted11. However, the information provided by the Carabineros after requests under the Transparency Law, identifies 227 wounded (75 of which seriously) and 15 killed by firearms in 2019 alone.
It is therefore possible to conclude that only a small proportion of the use of lethal force cases are charged by the prosecutor.
Non-official sources
- Annual Inform on Human Rights, University Diego Portales: https://derechoshumanos.udp.cl/informe-anual/.
Specific report regarding police use of force in 2019: https://derechoshumanos.udp.cl/cms/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/DDHH2022_01_Causas_Estallido.pdf - Lethal Force Monitor, Chilean chapter: https://www.monitorfuerzaletal.com/docs/MonitorFuerzaLetal_2022_Chile.pdf
Part 3: Comparative indicators
I-1a. CK: Number of civilians killed by law enforcement agents on duty, by gunshot | 21 |
I-1b. CKt: Number of civilians killed by law enforcement agents, regardless of means and whether or not on duty | 27 |
I-1c. CW: Number of civilians wounded by law enforcement agents on duty, by gunshot | 338 |
I-1d. CWt: Number of civilians wounded by law enforcement agents, whether or not on duty and regardless of means | Data unavailable |
I-2. CK per 100000 inhabitants | 0.110 |
I-3. CK per 1000 law enforcement agents | 0.389 |
I-4. CK per 1000 arrests | 0.044 |
I-5. CK per 1000 weapons seized | 6,209 |
I-6. AK: Number of law enforcement officers unlawfully killed on duty by firearm | 0 |
I-6b. AKt: Number of law enforcement officers unlawfully killed, whether or not on duty and regardless of means | 2 |
I-7. AK per 1000 agents | 0 |
A1. Percentage of homicides due to state intervention | 0.024 |
A2. Ratio between CK and AK | 21/0 |
A3. Civilian lethality index: Ratio between CK and CW | 0.236 |
A4. Lethality ratio: Ratio between Civilian lethality index and law enforcement agents lethality index | 0.236/0 |
A5. Average number of civilians killed by intentional gunshot, per incident | 1 |
Summary and recommendations
In the last twenty years, Chile has been experiencing important changes in terms of public safety, both in terms of the behavior of criminality and the institutional response to it. On the one hand, there is evidence of an increase in criminal violence, reflected in increasing but moderate homicide rates (in 2018 there was a rate of 4.5 homicides per 100 thousand inhabitants while in 2022 it will be 6.7) and in the prevalence of firearms as a means to commit them (in 2018 it corresponded to 42% of all completed homicides while in 2022 it will be 53.9%). On the other hand, in the process of democratic consolidation, the institutional framework has been progressively incorporating human rights standards and rules for law enforcement officers, which is reflected in the implementation of the accusatory criminal procedure (replacing an inquisitorial one) since 2000; the creation of the National Institute of Human Rights (INDH) in 2011; and the development of the first protocols for the use of force in 2012 for the Carabineros de Chile, among other important milestones.
To the above should be added that police institutions are amongst those that have generated greater trust in citizens over the last 20 years. However, this was affected between the years 2018 and 2020, due to facts firstly regarding the lack of probity of Carabineros and subsequently due to excessive use of force during the ‘social outburst’ of October 2019. These events motivated a police reform process still underway, which incorporates a cross-cutting approach to human rights13.
In this context, the regulation of the use of force has been debated in recent years, particularly with respect to the restrictions that international standards would impose on the ‘fight against crime’, since it would imply limitations on police action. This explains, to some extent, why there is no law that comprehensively regulates the use of force, but rather institutional instruments of diverse nature and scope that fail to address it in a comprehensive and systemic manner. It also explains that, at the same time, legislation is being passed to increase police protection through regulations such as the so-called Naim-Retamal law, which broadens the concept of legitimate self-defense for police officers who use force.
Although significant progress has been made with the drafting of protocols, this seems to be the only aspect with relevant development, as little or no change has been made to the procedures related to the registration of cases and administrative procedures (internal), their publicity and access and use of information (internal and external). In terms of the criminal investigation of cases, the most relevant milestone rooted in the prosecuting body (Prosecutor’s Office) corresponds to the creation of a unit for human rights, gender violence and sexual crimes in 2017, which will later be constituted as a specialized unit in human rights to provide advice on this matter to prosecutors throughout the country in cases related to the actions of state agents.
Some recommendations on these regards, proposed by the Chilean Chapter of the Lethal Force Monitor, are presented here:
- Produce a body of regulations with the status of law and deliberated in democratic spaces that guarantees adherence to international standards, as well as the mechanisms of supervision and accountability to which law enforcement officers, commanders and institutional decisions of the highest hierarchy must be subject. It must be applicable to all police organizations and to those that may eventually be called upon to perform law enforcement duties.
- An information mechanism is required to provide access to micro-data on events occurring during the use of lethal and less lethal weapons. This information system should make it possible to trace the cases and to know the administrative and criminal outcome (when applicable) associated with them.
- The system of general training and specific training in law and order must be carefully examined.
- Externally review the procedures of both administrative and criminal investigations, so that they are oriented towards a better police function with full respect for constitutional guarantees, human rights and international rules on the matter. To this end, investigations into deaths resulting from the intervention of State agents should be based on the hypothesis of homicide, which may be verified or ruled out in favor of legitimate self-defense. These investigations should always be carried out by an agency or, failing that, a unit other than the one to which the officer under investigation is attached, in order to guarantee the impartiality of the procedure.
- Finally, it will be important to create internal oversight committees to analyze cases, whose main function will be to generate recommendations for preventive measures and to promote behaviors and attitudes conducive to better police work, particularly with respect to the use of lethal and less lethal weapons.
References, data sources and downloads
1 See https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/navegar?idNorma=1126341
2 See https://www.camara.cl/verDoc.aspx?prmTIPO=OFICIOFISCALIZACIONRESPUESTA&prmID=87388&prmNUMERO=491&prmRTE=0
3 See https://www.portaltransparencia.cl/PortalPdT/documents/10179/62801/Resolucion+Nro+3+SAI+20382.pdf/df928ad3-9ec1-4511-843f-66206c961025
4 See http://www.fiscaliadechile.cl/Fiscalia/estadisticas/index.do
5 See https://bibliotecadigital.indh.cl/bitstream/handle/123456789/1775/IFP2020.pdf
6 See https://www.latercera.com/la-tercera-pm/noticia/cinco-lesiones-oculares-una-indemnizacion-de-10-millones-y-una-condena-en-suspenso-el-deja-vu-de-la-movilizacion-de-aysen-en-2012/925980/
7 See https://bibliotecadigital.indh.cl/browse/subject?value=ABUSO%20POLICIAL
8 See https://www.monitorfuerzaletal.com/docs/MonitorFuerzaLetal_2022_Chile.pdf
9 See https://www.ciperchile.cl/2020/10/13/pdi-desbarata-nuevo-montaje-para-encubrir-a-carabinero-baleo-a-joven-y-lo-presento-como-asalto/
10 See https://www.ciperchile.cl/2023/08/22/analisis-de-casos-anteriores-a-la-ley-nain-retamal-indica-que-fiscales-no-pedian-detener-o-suspender-a-carabineros-por-usar-sus-armas/
11 See https://www.latercera.com/la-tercera-sabado/noticia/uso-de-armas-23-de-carabineros-formalizados-fue-condenado/JSRQAQJMIJEVNOV24WPAYTJATA
12 The press information was obtained as a product of a systematic review process in digital media within the framework of the Chilean chapter of the Lethal Force Monitor. You can see the details at: https://www.monitorfuerzaletal.com/docs/MonitorFuerzaLetal_2022_Chile.pdf
13 More information in https://reformapolicias.interior.gob.cl/