Venezuela

• Introduction and background
• Part 1: Legal frameworks
• Part 2: Policies and procedures
• Part 3: Comparative indicators
• Summary and recommendations
• References and data sources

Introduction

Abstract

Venezuela is an example of opacity and secrecy with regard to official information, articulated with abusive police practices and linked to excesses of lethal force. Despite having advanced legislation in these matters, the regulatory mandates are not effective — neither in accountability nor in the limits on the exercise of the use of force. This shows that the problem is not legislative, but rather institutional and political. Since 2018, there has been no official information or figures on deaths due to the intervention of public forces. Consequently, for the period studied (2022), it was not possible to know the relationship between these cases and the total number of homicides — nor any other type of information related to the victims such as age, gender, or ethnic origin. Likewise, the State does not publish any official information on the number of agents killed by firearms. This absence of official information highlights the importance of establishing alternative and independent mechanisms for monitoring deaths due to intervention by public forces. The latest official figures from 2018 place the rate of people killed by the intervention of public forces at 16 deaths per one hundred thousand inhabitants, a rate that has not been observed in any other country in the region. Further, the number of international complaints, investigations, and convictions for these cases is an indicator of the state’s tolerance for these practices.

Background

Venezuela has been immersed for years in a multidimensional crisis, which encompasses economic, social¹, political, and institutional axes. Empirical research has already explained how, in these types of circumstances, the penal system operates in a more violent and authoritarian manner — increasing institutional violence of a lethal nature². These crises also seem to coincide with decreases in petroleum income: In times of economic contraction, social and political problems worsen, increasing institutional precariousness, state repression³, as well as illicit markets in which state agents themselves are involved⁴.

Added to the above is the consolidation in the country of a “hegemonic authoritarianism with totalitarian and sultanistic features”⁵, with a very important military predominance⁶ under which the logic of war and the permanent state of siege, accountability, and control in the exercise of power are precarious. The use of force without limits is an important asset for those who exercise political power in the country. This does not mean that it is an orderly, homogeneous, verticalized, centralized, monolithic authoritarian State that has everything under control, free from fissures, fragmentations, factions, or contradictions. On the contrary, it is a sometimes chaotic, institutionally precarious State that promotes the creation of small fiefdoms. These operate with certain levels of autonomy and can even compete and confront each other, but they also preserve certain levels of articulation and cohesion.

The security forces (civilian and military) are a constitutive part of this logic, guaranteeing the maintenance of power of the ruling coalition against any threat, being part of the beneficiaries of the different incomes (licit and illicit) that this system generates. It is a relationship of interdependence that does not revolve around public interests, but rather private and corporate ones. Precisely because of these characteristics, greater violence can be exercised by the State, as there are fewer limits and controls⁷.

The political, institutional, and social context of the data presented here, as well as the precariousness or non-existence of information and accountability regarding the use of force, must be carefully considered.

Institutionally, the police in Venezuela is made up of more than 123 municipal police forces, 23 state police forces, and a national police force, the Bolivarian National Police (PNB, Policía Nacional Bolivariana). Each has powers delimited to their respective geographical areas, which depend hierarchically on the highest political authority within these territories: the Mayor, for the municipalities, the Governor for the states, and the Minister of the Interior for the National Police. However, the Ministry of the Interior has general stewardship duties regarding police matters in the country and can intervene in regional police forces. The aforementioned security forces are uniformed police officers of a fundamentally preventive and ostensive nature, which together amounted to more than 200 thousand officers in 2019.

At another level, there are also two specialized national police forces: an investigative police force, the Scientific, Penal and Criminal Investigation Corps (CICPC, Cuerpo de Investigaciones Científicas Penales y Criminalísticas), and the political police: Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN). Finally, there is the Bolivarian National Guard (GNB), a component of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB), which performs military and police duties throughout the national territory.

This report covers all organizations that carry out police duties. It will primarily focus on the operation of the preventive police and the CICPC, which are the police forces that have historically generated the most deaths due to their intervention. The analysis period will be focused on the year 2022, but will also address more general trends to the extent that the information is available and necessary for the analysis.

Part 1: Legal Frameworks

Global treaties

1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)		State party
ICCPR Optional Protocol 1		State party
1984 Convention Against Torture (CAT)		State party
CAT committee competent to receive individual complaints?		Yes
CAT Optional Protocol 1		State party

Regional treaties

1948 Charter of the Organization of American States		Not party
1969 Inter-American Convention on Human Rights		Not party
1985 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture		State party
1990 Protocol to the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights relating to the Abolition of the Death Penalty		State party

National legal provisions

Relevant constitutional provisions or general laws

Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (CRBV). Extraordinary Official Gazette (GOE) No. 5,453 of March 24, 2000. Amended and published in GOE No. 5,908 of February 19, 2009:

• In its Article 2 it consecrates ‘life’ and ‘the preeminence of human rights’ as superior values of the legal system and the actions of the State. According to the CRBV, “The right to life is inviolable. No law may establish the death penalty, nor any authority apply it.” The State is obliged to protect “the lives of people who are deprived of their liberty, performing military or civil service, or subject to its authority in any other way” (Article 43). It also expressly prohibits the forced disappearance of people (article 45), prohibits torture and any other form of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 46).
• In its Article 19, it establishes the principle of progressivity, enjoyment, and inalienable, indivisible, and interdependent exercise in the guarantee of human rights.
• In its Article 23, it orders that the treaties, pacts, and conventions related to human rights signed and ratified by Venezuela have constitutional hierarchy and prevail in the internal order. By consequence, the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials as well as the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials are both part of the comprehensive of the Venezuelan legal system.
• In its Article 55, citizen security is presented as a guarantee of civil rights that the State must give to every citizen to protect their personal integrity, their property, as well as the enjoyment of their rights and the fulfillment of their duties. The State security forces will respect the dignity and human rights of all people. The use of weapons by police and security agents is limited by the principles of necessity, convenience, opportunity, and proportionality in accordance with the law.
• In its Article 68, it enshrines the right to demonstrate peacefully and without weapons, and it prohibits the use of firearms and toxic substances to control them.
• In its Article 332, it establishes that public order is part of citizen security; consequently, the bodies responsible for its maintenance and restoration are of a civil, not military, nature.

Penal Code (Código Penal), GOE No. 5,768, of April 13, 2005: it contains general provisions on crimes and misdemeanors. Death caused by firearms is punishable under the crime of homicide in Article 405.

In cases of extrajudicial executions, the legal classification would be qualified malicious homicide (Article 406.1), aggravated by abuse of the weapons of authority or use of any other means that weakens the defense of the offended party (Article 77.8), in ideal competition with breach of Conventions or Treaties concluded by the Republic (155.3). The sentence would range between 17 years and six months to 20 years, approximately 18 years and nine months in prison.

However, when the use of lethal force is justified by the defense of the official’s own life or that of a third party, it will not be punishable in accordance with Article 65, Paragraphs 1 and 3.

Organic Code of Criminal Procedure (Código Orgánico Procesal Penal), GOE No. 6,664 of September 17, 2021:

Article 119 states that the criminal investigation police must detain the accused in compliance with the following principles of action:

1. Use force only when strictly necessary and in the proportion required by the execution of the arrest.
2. Do not use weapons, except when there is resistance that endangers the life or physical integrity of people, within the limitations referred to in the previous paragraph.
3. Not to inflict, instigate or tolerate any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

Law for the Disarmament and Control of Weapons and Ammunition (Ley para el Desarme y Control de Armas y Municiones), Official Gazette (GO) No. 40,190 of June 17, 2013: The Law aims to regulate and supervise the carrying, possession, use, registration, manufacturing, marketing, supply, storage, registration, import, export, transit, and transportation of all types of weapons, ammunition, accessories, parts, and components; classify and punish illegal acts arising from this matter.

The law defines the types of weapons and specifically defines ‘organic weapons’’ as firearms used by the Bolivarian National Armed Forces, police forces, bodies and institutions that exceptionally perform functions of the police service, as well as other organizations of the State authorized to acquire weapons, duly authorized and registered by the body of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces with jurisdiction over arms control (Article 5.1). The carrying and use of these organic weapons is the exclusive power of these organizations and other State entities authorized to acquire weapons (Article 40). The provision of these weapons will correspond to the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (Article 42).

The improper use of these organic weapons by officials who use their organic weapons for purposes other than legitimate defense or protection of public order will be punished in accordance with Article 115 (six to eight years in prison).

Relevant specific national legislation

Organic Law of the Police Service and the Bolivarian National Police Corps (Ley Orgánica del Servicio de Policía y del Cuerpo de Policía Nacional Bolivariana), GOE No. 5,940 of December 7, 2009: This law specifically regulates police action and the use of force in its Chapter II, Articles 68 to 72, in which it establishes the guiding principles of the use of force for all the country’s security forces that carry out police work.

Article 68 states that the use of force by police forces will be guided by the principle of affirmation of life as a supreme constitutional and legal value, the adoption of progressive scales for the use of force depending on the level of resistance and opposition of the citizen, the procedures for monitoring and supervising its use, and permanent police training and dissemination of instructions among the community. The use of deadly force will only be justified to defend the life of the police officer or a third party.

Article 69 orders that police forces will have means that allow police officials to use force differently, and they must be permanently trained in its use.

Article 70 considers the levels of use of force:

Police officers will use physical force in accordance with the following criteria:

1. The level of use of force to be applied is determined by the conduct of the person and not by the predisposition of the officer.
2. The differentiated use of force implies that, between psychological intimidation and potentially fatal force, the official will grade its use considering the progression from passive resistance to life-threatening aggression on the part of the person.
3. The police officer must maintain the lowest level of use of force possible to achieve the proposed objective.
4. At no time should there be unnecessary physical harm or moral abuse to the people targeted by police action, nor should force be used as a form of direct punishment.

Relevant national regulations

Standards and principles for the Progressive and Differentiated Use of the Police Force by officials of the police forces in their various territorial political spheres (NUPDFP, Normas y principios para el Uso Progresivo y Diferenciado de la Fuerza Policial por parte de los funcionarios y funcionarias de los cuerpos de policía en sus diversos ámbitos político territoriales), GO No. 39,390 of March 19, 2010. These standards develop the mandates of the Organic Law of the Police Service and the Bolivarian National Police Corps regarding the use of force for all security forces in the country that carry out police work. The police force is guided in all cases by the affirmation of life as a supreme value; for these purposes, it must be applied in a necessary, progressive, and differentiated manner (Article 1 of the NUPDFP):

…based exclusively on the level of resistance and opposition that the person manifests to prevent, hinder, or enervate a police intervention, reducing the use of physical force to the minimum required for effective containment, reducing the probability of producing injuries or damage, whether physical or moral, based on the principles of legality, necessity, and proportionality.

These regulations establish seven differentiated and progressive levels of the use of police force, which act in correspondence with the level of resistance and opposition of the citizen. It begins at minimum levels with mere police presence until reaching the last level —extraordinary, exceptional— of potentially deadly force. This last assumption is only justified when the conditions of legitimate defense or state of necessity, as established in the Penal Code, are met.

Manual for Progressive and Differentiated Use of the Police Force (Manual de Uso Progresivo y Diferenciado de la Fuerza Policial) of 2010 aims to establish standards and procedures for action within the framework of respect for human rights related to the use of police force. It is regulated under the concept of the Police Service as established in the Law: prevailing respect for the principles of legality, necessity, and proportionality, framed in professional ethics. In this sense, it is a tool for mandatory use without any type of distinction due to level of hierarchical organization, rank, or position in the exercise of the function, as well as in the training and police specialization that will be applied throughout the national, state, and municipal territorial political sphere (p.17).

Rules on the actions of the Police Forces in their various territorial political spheres to guarantee public order, social peace and citizen coexistence in public meetings and demonstrations (Normas sobre la actuación de los Cuerpos de Policía en sus diversos ámbitos políticos territoriales para garantizar el orden público, la paz social y la convivencia ciudadana en reuniones públicas y manifestaciones), GO No. 39,658 of April 18, 2011 aims to regulate the action of the police forces in their various territorial political spheres to guarantee public order, social peace, and citizen coexistence in public meetings and demonstrations within the development of the democratic and social State of Law and Justice and the protection of the human rights (Article 1). These standards include an action manual.

Rules of Action of the Bolivarian National Armed Force in functions of control of public order, social peace, and citizen coexistence in public meetings and demonstrations (Normas de Actuación de la Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana en funciones de control del orden público, la paz social y la convivencia ciudadana en reuniones públicas y manifestaciones), GO No. 40,589 of January 27, 2015, known as Resolution 8610, allows the Armed Forces the use of firearms to control public demonstrations. These norms collide with the Constitution and with the legal block described above.

Organic Penitentiary Code (Código Orgánico Penitenciario), GOE No. 6,647 of September 17, 2021, governs the use of force in penitentiary establishments. Article 90 regulates the carrying of weapons inside the prison by officials in charge of security and custody in these establishments. It states that firearms can be used in self-defense or in defense of third parties when preventing a serious crime that leads to a serious threat to life and when lesser means are insufficient to prevent an escape. The following article orders that —in the case of use of firearms— at least three warning shots must be fired, and then the shots must be aimed at the lower extremities in order to minimize injuries and protect the person’s life as much as possible. These norms collide with the Constitution and with the legal block described above.

Legal interpretation and application

UN or other international body decisions or advisory opinions

Organization of American States (OAS)

• On September 14, 2017, the Secretary General of the OAS appointed a Panel of Independent International Experts whose task was to analyze whether there is a reasonable basis to establish that the current Government of Venezuela has committed crimes against humanity, and to determine if there is a basis for referring the situation to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
• On May 29, 2018, the report —signed by the Secretary of the OAS together with the Panel of Independent International Experts— was published. It indicated that there were ‘sufficient grounds’ about the commission of crimes against humanity in Venezuela, which date back to at least February 12, 2014. The report recommends the following: the Secretary General of the OAS forward this Report and the evidence collected by the General Secretariat of the OAS to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC); the Secretary General invite the States Parties to the Rome Statute to refer the situation in Venezuela to the ICC Prosecutor’s Office; ask the Prosecutor to open an investigation into the crimes against humanity that are included in this Report, in accordance with the provisions of Article 14 of the Rome Statute. This first report includes, among others, the identification of 8,292 extrajudicial executions documented since 2015.
• On December 2, 2020, the General Secretariat of the OAS presented a second report that expanded on the previous report and reaffirmed the commission of crimes against humanity in Venezuela. It also questions the Prosecutor’s Office of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for inaction before these crimes. It notes that since the publication of the 2018 report, crimes against humanity in Venezuela have increased in scale, scope, and severity. Among the findings of the second report is the identification of 18,093 extrajudicial executions carried out by State security forces since 2014. It also identified 724 cases of forced disappearance between the years 2018 and 2019, and 653 documented cases of torture since 2014.

International Criminal Court

• On 26 September 2018, Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru referred the situation of Venezuela to the ICC, asking the Court to investigate crimes against humanity committed in Venezuela since February 12, 2014. This move marks the first state referral of another State Party’s situation in the history of the ICC. The Office of the Prosecutor has an ongoing preliminary examination of alleged crimes committed since at least April 2017 in Venezuela in the context of demonstrations and related political unrest.
• In 2020, the Office concluded that there was a reasonable basis to believe that crimes against humanity, particularly in the context of detention, have been committed in Venezuela since at least April 2017. Since then, the preliminary examination has also focused on the existence and genuineness of national proceedings as part of the admissibility assessment.
• On November 3, 2021, the ICC Prosecutor’s Office announced that the preliminary examination had concluded with the decision to continue investigations.
• On April 16, 2022, the ICC Prosecutor’s Office notified the Pre-Trial Chamber that it had received a request from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to defer the Prosecutor’s investigations in favor of actions carried out by the national authorities of Venezuela, in accordance with article 18 of the Rome Statute. In the same notification, the Prosecutor also informed the Pre-Trial Chamber of his intention to request, as soon as possible, authorization to resume the Office’s investigations — having examined the basis for the postponement request.
• On November 1, 2022, the Prosecutor submitted a request to the Pre-Trial Chamber requesting authorization to resume the investigation into the Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
• On June 27, 2023, Pre-Trial Chamber I authorized the ICC Prosecutor’s Office to resume its investigation into the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela I.
• Venezuela deposited its instrument of ratification of the Rome Statute on June 7, 2000. The ICC has been able to exercise jurisdiction over Rome Statute crimes committed in the territory of Venezuela or by its nationals since July 1, 2002.

OHCHR report

The UN Human Rights Office has a history of monitoring and reporting on the human rights situation in Venezuela. It has issued two public reports (2017 and 2018) based on the High Commissioner’s global mandate under General Assembly Resolution 48/141. Since September 2019, the High Commissioner has also provided oral updates and reports to the Human Rights Council pursuant to Resolutions 39/1 (2018), 42/4 (2019), 42/25 (2019), 45/2 (2020), and 45/20 (2020). The UN Human Rights Office continues its technical assistance, monitoring, and reporting work as provided for in Human Rights Council resolution A/HRC/51/29 (2022).

It is noteworthy that on July 4, 2019, the Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) was presented — led by the former Chilean president Michelle Bachelet. It generated numerous debates about the situation of civil and political rights in Venezuela because of the presentation of official figures of homicides and deaths due to the intervention of the State security forces for the year 2018, which until that point had been unknown.

Said report questioned the actions of the Special Action Forces (FAES, Fuerza de Acciones Especiales), requesting its dissolution and investigation of the extrajudicial executions carried out by this division, expressing the following (p.16):

Thousands of people, mainly young men, have been killed in alleged clashes with state forces in recent years. There are reasonable grounds to believe that many of these deaths constitute extrajudicial executions carried out by security forces, particularly the FAES. OHCHR is concerned that the authorities may be using the FAES, and possibly other security forces, as part of a policy of social control. These violent deaths require an immediate investigation to ensure the accountability of the perpetrators and guarantees of non-repetition.

The report notes that proportion of alleged extrajudicial executions committed by security forces, particularly the FAES, in the context of police operations has been surprisingly high. The government informed the OHCHR that between January 1 and May 19, 2019, there were some 1,569 violent deaths due to ‘resistance to authority’ (p.11).

According to official figures provided to the OHCHR, in the case of 2018, 15,885 homicides were recorded, of which 5,287 deaths were due to ‘resistance to authority’. That is, 33% of the homicides that occurred in the country, were a consequence of the intervention of public forces.

The report also emphasizes that the majority of victims of human rights violations have not had real access to justice or adequate reparation. “According to those interviewed, few people file complaints, due to fear of reprisals or lack of confidence in the justice system” (p.12). Those who do, mostly women, face omnipresent obstacles and, in most cases, stalled investigations.

Prosecutors from the Attorney-General’s Office reproduce police logic of intimidation and mistreatment against the surviving victims or the relatives who promote the investigation of the cases, many show solidarity with the perpetrators and protect the officials involved: “often the judicial authorities have reversed the burden of proof by refusing to open investigations unless the victims identified those responsible” (p.10).

Subsequently, broadly speaking, the OHCHR reports and updates indicate that, in Venezuela, the security forces responded with excessive force and other repressive measures to protests in which various sectors of the population participated. Impunity persisted for the continued extrajudicial executions committed by security forces. Despite the approval of legal reforms related to the administration of justice, victims continued to have difficulties accessing the right to truth and reparation. By the end of 2022, more than 7.1 million Venezuelans had fled the country. There have been lengthy delays in investigating deaths during protests that took place in 2014, 2017 and 2019. Furthermore, of the 101 deaths that OHCHR has documented in the context of security operations, only eight have been brought to trial. Additionally, OHCHR reported that government authorities had dissolved the FAES of the Bolivarian National Police, which had participated in several hundred alleged extrajudicial executions. However, the government did not make any public statement on this issue and civil society organizations continued to denounce that the FAES remained active under other names.

Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela (MIIDHV, Misión Internacional Independiente de Determinación de los Hechos sobre Venezuela)

On September 27, 2019, the United Nations Human Rights Council established an Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela (hereafter La Misión), through Resolution 42/25 for a period of one year to evaluate alleged violations of human rights committed since 2014. The mandate of La Misión was extended by the Council through Resolutions 45/20 and 51/29, until September 2024.

On September 25, 2020, it published its first report, which focused on the patterns of behavior in which the four human rights violations provided for in the mandate occurred: extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, and torture and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment. Within each pattern of behavior, the report discusses specific incidents in detail as illustrative examples of the patterns within which they occurred. It highlights:

The majority of people murdered in the cases investigated did not have criminal records or outstanding arrest warrants against them (…) There are reasonable grounds to believe that security forces committed extrajudicial executions, as well as arbitrary arrests and detentions (…) There is a clear pattern of the Government claiming that the deaths occurred as a result of clashes or that the victims were resisting authority at the time of their death. (…) In addition, the victims were fatally shot in vital areas, sometimes at point-blank range. The fatal shootings suggest that security forces did not attempt to employ non-lethal methods of control, deterrence, or containment before using deadly force. In the cases investigated, no deaths were reported by the security forces, so it seems unlikely that there was an armed confrontation. (p.12)

La Misión also conducted an extensive review of cases reported by the local press between January 2014 and December 2019 in order to corroborate patterns and changes over time. In total, La Misión examined 2,417 incidents in which 4,681 deaths occurred by security forces. (p.13)

The official version of events in many cases was that the victims were killed while resisting arrest, in a confrontation and/or during an exchange of gunfire. However, La Misión received direct evidence that contradicts the official version. Witnesses interviewed stated that the victims were last seen or heard from under the control of police officers, including on a bed, on the floor, with a hood over the victim’s head, or with their hands raised. Despite efforts to remove them from the scene, in some cases witnesses saw the officers fire the fatal shot. (p.14)

A source with internal knowledge of PNB/FAES operations told La Misión that, after the background check, the head of the operation in direct communication with superiors could request and receive “the green light to kill”. A former PNB/FAES officer interviewed by La Misión said that he and his colleagues refer to the murders as “squaring people up”. This interviewee said that there is a ‘triangle’ from the victim’s chest upwards “where people are allowed to shoot” (idem). Officials often fire shots to imitate a shooting “or take an illegal weapon they have […] and leave it there”. Another source told La Misión that the police used to plant a gun or a grenade (called in the jargon ‘agricultural missions’ to plant ‘seeds’) and then claim that there was an armed confrontation. (p.15)

La Misión has reasonable grounds to believe that the acts and conduct described in this report constitute “arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial executions, torture, and other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment — including sexual and gender-based violence, forced disappearances (often short-term duration), and arbitrary detentions, in violation of national legislation and Venezuela’s international obligations”. (p.19)

Regarding the extrajudicial executions committed by the PNB/FAES and the CICPC, La Misión has reasonable grounds to believe that certain high-level authorities were aware of these crimes and contributed to their commission. Others, in their capacity as commanders and superiors, knew or should have known of their commission and, having effective command and control, did not adopt measures to prevent or repress them. The responsibility of the regional and state authorities of these forces corresponds to the areas in which they exercised authority and effective control. (p.19)

Also in the detailed conclusions of the same report it states (p.425):

Former FAES officers revealed to La Misión that the regional directors of the FAES requested statistics of deaths and detainees as a weekly or monthly procedure. Brigade leaders were responsible for collecting these statistics. A FAES officer indicated that FAES personnel were given instructions such as “today I want one dead […] each brigade has to have one dead”. Failure to comply could lead to reprimands. According to one FAES officer, compliance, particularly when a suspected criminal had been ‘eliminated’, helped officers achieve promotions. La Misión’s investigations revealed a common understanding within these forces regarding the ‘elimination’ of individuals during operations, regardless of whether the use of force was necessary and proportionate.

La Misión has also received direct information about explicit orders to commit extrajudicial executions where the respective Brigade Chiefs issued those orders (p.426).

In La Misión’s opinion, the attack was widespread and systematic. The perpetration of 54 acts of extrajudicial executions, 112 acts of illegal imprisonment and 95 acts of torture and other cruel or inhuman treatment that La Misión investigated were indicative of broader patterns of conduct, as demonstrated throughout this report. Furthermore, the conduct took place over a period of more than five years and throughout the territory of Venezuela. Therefore, the attack was widespread. Furthermore, the attack was organized, as opposed to an ‘accidental’ repetition of similar conduct. As noted, the crimes followed similar patterns; The same modus operandi was used to attack the victims. Therefore, the attack was systematic (p.435).

In a second report, presented in September 2021, La Misión focused its investigation on the justice system and its response to human rights violations and crimes it documented, since “the investigation of violations of the right to life must begin by trade. The fact that cases of death after the use of force are not properly investigated may in itself constitute a violation of the right to life” (2020, p, 8). Several of the officials among those investigated by La Misión continue to work for these organizations and in some cases have been promoted.

In a third report, presented in September 2022, it shows detailed conclusions on “Crimes against humanity committed through State intelligence services: structures and people involved in the implementation of a plan to repress opposition to the government”. In Point 5, the report states, “La Misión finds reasonable grounds to believe that during the period under review, arbitrary detentions were used to attack people because of their affiliation, political participation, their points of view, and their opinions and expressions” (pp.4–5). They also released another report on the situation in remote mining areas and highlighted the situation in the state of Bolívar, in the south of the country, where state and non-state actors have committed a series of violations and crimes against local populations in gold mining areas.

La Misión regrets that, despite repeated calls from the UN Human Rights Council, the Venezuelan authorities continue to prevent Mission personnel from carrying out investigations in Venezuelan territory, and they have not responded to the —at least— 23 letters sent from La Misión.

Regional court judgments

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has treated the following cases:

• El Amparo vs. Venezuela (1996) refers to events that occurred after October 29, 1988. That day, sixteen fishermen from the town of El Amparo, Venezuela were heading to the La Colorada canal through the Arauca river, located in Apure State to participate in a ‘fishing trip’. At approximately 11:20am, when some fishermen were getting off the boat, military and police members of the José Antonio Páez Specific Command (CEJAP) opened fire on them, killing fourteen of the sixteen fishermen. On August 1, 1994, the Venezuelan State sent its response to the complaint and, by means of a note dated January 11, 1995, reaffirmed that Venezuela “did not contain the facts referred to in the complaint and that it accepted the international responsibility of the State”.2018 Court Resolution:
  

  … in the exercise of its powers to supervise compliance with its decisions, in accordance with Articles 33, 62.1, 62.3, 65, 67 and 68.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 24, 25 and 30 of the Statute, and 31.2 and 69 of its Regulations, RESOLVES: 1. To declare, in accordance with what is stated in Consideration 10 of this Resolution, that the State continues without complying with the measure of reparation related to continuing the investigations of the events referred to in this case and sanction those who are responsible (fourth operative paragraph of the Judgment on reparations and costs ). 2. Keep open the compliance supervision procedure with respect to the reparation measure ordered in the fourth operative paragraph of the Reparations Judgment, regarding continuing the investigations of the facts referred to in this case and sanctioning those who are responsible.

• El Caracazo vs. Venezuela (1999): On February 27, 1989, an undetermined number of people from the popular strata began a series of riots in the city of Guarenas, State of Miranda, as a consequence of the increase in urban transportation rates and the lack of recognition of preferential student passage by the Executive Branch. These riots later spread “to other areas of the Caracas Metropolitan Area (…), La Guaira, Maracay, Valencia, Barquisimeto, Guayana, Mérida, Maracaibo, and the areas adjacent to the transport terminal”. That day, a section of the Metropolitan Police was on strike, which is why it did not intervene in a timely manner to control the riots.According to statements by the then President of the Republic “there was no organization to prevent and confront, at the beginning, what was happening (…) after returning from the city of Barquisimeto, when he passed through an area of Caracas near the Presidential Palace called El Silence, [he saw] the destroyed display cases, upon arriving in Miraflores he called the Minister of Defense and ordered him to proceed with the mobilization of military personnel”. Control of the situation was entrusted to military forces, for which approximately nine thousand troops were brought from the interior of the country. These forces were made up of young people of 17 and 18 years old recruited in February 1989. From statements by senior army officers, former Ministers of State, and the Former President of the Republic, it is clear that the armed forces were not prepared to assume control of the public order. The young people who were sent, due to their youth and inexperience, constituted a danger to the lives and physical integrity of people. Likewise, it appears that these young people were equipped with assault weapons (FAL or Light Automatic Rifle, 7.62mm) and AMX-13 armored vehicles, to control the civilian population. The officers used high-powered 9mm caliber pistols. Most of the 44 deaths were caused by indiscriminate shooting by military agents while others were the result of extrajudicial executions. After nine years of the exhumations being carried out, the investigations remained in the summary stage of the process.2020.Court Resolution:
  

  1. The State has committed a serious breach of its duty to report on the execution of the five reparations that are pending compliance ordered in the Judgment of the Caracazo case (…) 2. The State has not complied with the five reparations ordered in the Reparations Judgment of the present case…

• Barrios Family vs. Venezuela (2011): The events of this case occurred in the town of Guanayén, Aragua State. On August 28, 1998, police officers detained, attacked, and murdered Benito Barrios. On December 11, 2003, Narciso Barrios was also murdered by police officers. On March 3, 2004, Jorge and Rigoberto Barrios were detained, attacked, and threatened by police officers. Additionally, on June 19, 2004, six other members of the Barrios family —including two children— were detained and attacked by police officers. Likewise, the residences of some members of the Barrios family were raided by police agents, who stole and destroyed their property. Several members of the Barrios family had to leave Guanayén to live in other regions. Despite a series of appeals having been filed, no further investigations have been carried out, nor have those responsible for the events been punished.Court Decision:
  

  1. The State is responsible for the violation of the right to life established in article 4.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights, in relation to article 1.1 of said instrument (…) it is responsible for the violation of the right to personal integrity, established in article 5 of the Convention (…) is responsible for the violation of the right to personal liberty, established in article 7 of the Convention (…)

• Uzcátegui and others vs. Venezuela (2012): The case refers to the alleged extrajudicial execution of Néstor José Uzcátegui on January 1, 2001 by members of the Falcón State police; to the alleged persecution of Luis Enrique Uzcátegui by members of the same police force as a reaction to the search for justice in relation to the death of his brother Néstor José; to the also-alleged illegal and arbitrary detention and raids carried out, for the same motivations, against the personal integrity of the relatives of the Uzcáteguis; to the threats against the life and personal integrity of Luis Enrique Uzcátegui, who has also had to face a process for the crime of defamation against him and move from his place of residence; and, finally, to the alleged lack of judicial protection and enforcement of due judicial guarantees.Néstor José Uzcátegui, then 21 years old, lived with members of his family in a home located in the urban Velita II, in the city of Coro and state of Falcón. On the morning of January 1, 2001, officials from the Police Investigation Directorate and an elite group of the Armed Police Forces of the state of Falcón raided the home of the Uzcátegui family without a court order and with violence while the family was celebrating the new year. During the police operation, the police officers used firearms against Néstor José Uzcátegui, shooting him at least twice — without legitimacy and, where appropriate, necessity and proportionality of the use of firearms having been demonstrated for lethal force. Néstor José Uzcátegui died as a result of the shots received. These events were framed in a context in which extrajudicial executions and other abuses occurred by police forces, particularly by state and municipal police. At that time, “the disproportionate, indiscriminate and discretionary use […] of force, negligence and inexperience in the use of firearms, threats and harassment, simulation of executions, arbitrary detentions, illegal searches, delays in transfers of injured people to health centers after having injured them, shots in the air, adulteration of cartridges, [and] carrying of illegal weapons,” among other situations.Court Decision :
  

  The State is responsible for the violation of the right to life, recognized in Article 4.1 of the American Convention on Human Rights, in relation to Article 1.1 of said instrument (…) it is responsible for the violation of the right to personal liberty, recognized in Articles 7.1, 7.2 and 7.4 of the Convention (…) is responsible for the violation of the right to personal integrity, recognized in Article 5.1 of the Convention (…)

• Landaeta Mejías Brothers and others vs. Venezuela (2014): On November 17, 1996, Igmar Alexander Landaeta Mejías died from two gunshot wounds after an alleged confrontation with police intelligence agents. After said events, the agents transferred his body to the Type III Ambulatory Center of Turmero and then left without identifying themselves. Regarding Eduardo José Landaeta Mejías, 17 years old, the Court confirmed that on December 29, 1996, a month and a half after the death of his brother, he was detained by agents of the Security and Public Order Corps of Aragua State (CSOPEA, Cuerpo de Seguridad y Orden Público del Estado Aragua), and taken to the San Carlos Neighborhood Barracks. This was in relation to an alleged investigation that was being investigated before the Mariño Section. Later he was transferred to the Central Barracks. He died in the custody of CSOPEA police during the transfer from the Central Police Command to the Mariño Section, after having been detained for a period of more than 38 hours. The autopsy protocol identified the existence of more injuries, in addition to those caused by the projectile impacts.The Court ruled that the Venezuelan State is internationally responsible for the violation of the obligation to respect and guarantee the right to life of Igmar Alexander Landaeta Mejías, in relation to the duty to adopt provisions of domestic law. Likewise, the Court established that the State is responsible for the violation of the right to personal freedom and the obligation to respect and guarantee the rights to life and personal integrity, in relation to the rights of the child, to the detriment of Eduardo José Landaeta Mejías, who was 17 years old at the time of the events. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the Venezuelan State is responsible for the violation of the rights to judicial guarantees, judicial protection, and personal integrity of the relatives of the Landaeta Mejías brothers. The Court found that at the time of the occurrence of the events there was a serious problem of police abuses in various states of Venezuela, including Aragua State, and that the brothers Igmar Alexander and Eduardo José —both with surnames Landaeta Mejías and aged 18 and 17 years of age respectively— after threats and harassment lost their lives due to actions by officials of the CSOPEA.
• Díaz Loreto and others vs. Venezuela (2019): On November 19, 2019, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued a ruling against Venezuela for the violation of the right to life (Article 4 of the American Convention) to the detriment of Robert Ignacio Díaz Loreto, David Octavio Díaz Loreto, and Octavio Ignacio Díaz Álvarez for the events that led to their deaths at the hands of police officials from Aragua State. The State was also found responsible for having violated the right to personal integrity and personal freedom to the detriment of Robert Ignacio Díaz Loreto for the events that occurred after he was injured in a police vehicle. Likewise, it was indicated that the State had violated the guarantee of due process (Article 8.1 of the Convention) and the personal integrity of the next of kin of Robert Ignacio Díaz Loreto, David Octavio Díaz Loreto, and Octavio Ignacio Díaz Álvarez for not having fulfilled their duty to investigate, as well as for the suffering that their deaths caused them and for the acts of threats and intimidation of which they were victims as a result of these events. The Court recalled that at the time of the facts of the case there existed in Venezuela —and particularly in Aragua State— a context of extrajudicial executions by police officials. This context was recognized by public institutions, both internally and at an international level. The events of the case took place on January 6, 2003, in the Segundera sector of the city of Cagua, Aragua State. Mr. Robert Ignacio Díaz Loreto was shot by officials of the Security and Public Order Corps of Aragua State (CSOPEA) and was later transferred to the Seguro Social de la Cornisa health center, in the city of Cagua, where he was dead on arrival. In a second event, David Octavio Díaz Loreto, and Octavio Ignacio Díaz Álvarez were shot by police officers. They were later transferred and left lifeless at the José María Vargas Hospital, also in the city of Cagua. Based on these events, the authorities undertook investigation and prosecution proceedings against those allegedly responsible for the deaths of Robert Ignacio Díaz Loreto, David Octavio Díaz Loreto, and Octavio Ignacio Díaz Álvarez, after which they were acquitted by a final sentence on September 4, 2014. On the other hand, the Court verified that in the present case, several relatives of the three victims were subjected to threats and intimidation during the development of the investigation and the process.
• Guerrero, Molina, and others vs. Venezuela (2021): The facts of the case refer to the extrajudicial execution of Jimmy Guerrero, 26 years old at the time of his death, and his relative Ramón Molina on March 30, 2003, by police personnel in Falcón State. They include previous acts of harassment, illegal, and arbitrary detentions and torture committed against Jimmy Guerrero by police forces, as well as the lack of adequate investigation of the deaths and the other events referred. The Court considered it proven that the events referred to were related to an increase in homicides and police violence in Venezuela, as well as in Falcón State in particular, which affected young men in poverty to a greater extent. At the same time, there was a high degree of impunity regarding said violence.Court Decision :
  

  4. The State is responsible for the violation of the right to personal liberty, contained in Article 7 of the American Convention on Human Rights, in its Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, in relation to the obligation to respect the rights without discrimination, which arises from Article 1.1 of the same treaty (…) for the violation of the right to personal integrity, established in Article 5 of the American Convention on Human Rights, in its Paragraphs 1 and 2 (…) for the violation of the right to life, recognized in Article 4.1 of the Convention (…)

There are two other sentences for violation of the right to life by State security forces against prisoners:

• Montero Aranguren and others (Retén de Catia) (2006) for the alleged extrajudicial execution of 37 inmates at the Catia Detention Center —located in the city of Caracas, Venezuela— in the early hours of November 27, 1992;
• Olivares Muñoz and others vs. Venezuela (2020) for the violation of the right to life of seven deceased people, as well as the deprivation of liberty and the right to personal integrity of another 27 who were injured on November 10, 2003 at the Ciudad Bolívar Judicial Confinement Center, known as the prison of Vista Hermosa.

In all cases these are final sentences, either due to convictions or because the State has assumed responsibility (Amparo and El Caracazo cases). However, despite the condemnations, Venezuela has not complied with any of the sentences.

National court judgments

The Judgment of the Criminal Cassation Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 1026 of July 25, 2000, acquitted police officers who shot at the driver of a vehicle since this driver did not comply with the police commission’s warning. The sentence justifies that anyone who does not heed the call to stop may be shot by the police so that they will comply with said stop order. Furthermore, the ruling indicates that the police officer who kills a person who does not respond to the call to stop should not be punished, and that said officer is acting under a justification cause (fulfillment of a position or office) of Article 65 of the Venezuelan Penal Code. Said sentence contains a saved vote in which the excess committed by this decision is pointed out by serving as a guarantee for police officers to shoot indiscriminately against those who do not heed the call to stop.

The Ruling of the Political-Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, No. 840 of July 27, 2016 rejected a challenge to the legality of the order that allowed the armed forces to use firearms to control demonstrations. The Supreme Court argued that the references to the right to life in Resolution No. 008610 of the Standards of Action of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces in functions of control of public order, social peace and citizen coexistence in public meetings and demonstrations (published in Official Gazette No. 40,589, of January 27, 2015), meant that it was not intrinsically illegal.

For the Chamber, the Resolution being challenged would be regulating the use of force authorized therein in order to set parameters of action for officials of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces. Although Article 68 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (CRBV) expressly prohibits the use of firearms in public demonstrations, the contested resolution expressly allows it in any type of demonstration, whether peaceful or violent.

Therefore, the decision was to allow the Appeal for Annulment, but the requested precautionary protection was declared inadmissible, since “it is reiterated that what is prohibited by the constitutional text is the use of firearms and toxic substances in the control of peaceful demonstrations… not so in those that are violent or that become violent”.

Oversight bodies

Ombudsman’s Office

It is one of the entities of the Citizen Power formed together with the Attorney-General’s Office and the Comptroller General of the Republic, as part of the system of checks and balances of the national Public Power. It has its origin in the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (CRBV) of 1999, which recognizes, for the first time, an autonomous power to guarantee the morality and transparency of the State: ‘Citizen Power’. By a constitutional mandate, the Ombudsman’s Office has the purpose of promoting, monitoring, and defending human rights in the country. It is directed by the Ombudsman who is responsible for promoting, defending, and supervising the rights guaranteed in the Constitution and in the human rights treaties to which Venezuela is a party. However, this regulatory mandate is not fulfilled in reality, and the Citizen Power is currently co-opted by the Executive Power.

Attorney-General’s Office (MP, Ministerio Público)

Beyond its historical genesis that dates back to the Constitution of Gran Colombia of 1830, its history and most recent form begins with the CRBV of 1999. It is part of the Citizen Power, which is currently exercised by body of the Republican Moral Council, made up of the Attorney General of the Republic, the Ombudsman, and the Comptroller General of the Republic. The Attorney-General’s Office is formally autonomous and independent (Articles 284 and 285 CRBV). Among its functions is to carry out the actions that may be necessary to enforce the responsibility incurred by public officials, including cases of homicides committed by police and military officials. However, this regulatory mandate is not fulfilled in reality, and the Citizen Power is currently co-opted by the Executive Power.

On the other hand, the Organic Law of the Police Service and the Bolivarian National Police Corps (LOSPCPNB, Ley Orgánica del Servicio de Policía y Cuerpo de Policía Nacional Bolivariana) of 2009 generally contemplates two types of controls: internal control (inspectors or internal affairs offices) as an exclusive instance of accountability on deviant conduct of officials, considered individually; and external controls, such as citizen committees, which were established in Articles 79, 80 and 81.

Part 2: Policies and Procedures

Data collection and publication by official agencies

1. Are the number of deaths following any police use of force
	Collected?	No Provisions
	Accessible through existing publicly available information?	No Provisions
	Is this a legal requirement?	Partial, Medium
	Can such information be requested from the authorities when not publicly available?	Partial, Medium
	If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released?	No Provisions
2. If published, to what extent can the number of deaths be readily determined from official statistics?		No Provisions
3. Is it possible to identify specific individuals killed in official records?		No Provisions
4. Is demographic and other information for the deceased
	Collected?	No Provisions
	Accessible through existing publicly available information?	No Provisions
	Is this a legal requirement?	Partial, Medium
	Can such information be requested from the authorities when not publicly available?	Partial, Medium
	If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released?	No Provisions
5. Is demographic and other information on officers in use of force incidents
	Collected?	No Provisions
	Accessible through existing publicly available information?	No Provisions
	Is this a legal requirement?	Partial, Medium
	Can such information be requested from the authorities when not publicly available?	Partial, Medium
	If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released?	No Provisions
6. Is information on the circumstances
	Collected?	No Provisions
	Publicly available?	No Provisions
	Is this a legal requirement?	Partial, Medium
	Can such information be requested from the authorities when not publicly available?	Partial, Medium
	If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released?	No Provisions
7. Is information about the type(s) of force used
	Collected?	No Provisions
	Accessible through existing publicly available information?	No Provisions
	Is this a legal requirement?	Partial, Medium
	Can such information be requested from the authorities when not publicly available?	Partial, Medium
	If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released?	No Provisions

Data quality of official sources

8. How reliable are the sources used to produce official statistics about deaths?		Limited, Poor
9. Are there mechanisms for internal quality assurance / verification conducted		No Provisions
10. Is the methodology for data collection publicised?		No Provisions
11. How reliable are the overall figures produced?		Limited, Poor

Data analysis and lessons learnt

12. Do state or police agencies analyse data on the use of lethal force, to prevent future deaths?		No Provisions
13. Is there evidence that state/ police agencies act on the results of their analysis, including applying lessons learnt?		No Provisions
14. Are external bodies are able to reuse data for their own analyses?		Limited, Poor
15. Do external, non-governmental agencies collect and publish their own statistics on deaths following police use of force?		Partial, Medium

Investigations by official agencies

16. Is there a legal requirement for deaths to be independently investigated?		Good, Robust
17. If so, which organisation(s) conduct these investigations?		Attorney-General’s office
18. In the year in question, how many deaths following police use of force have been investigated by the organisation(s) specified in question 17?		Data unavailable
19. Are close relatives of the victims involved in the investigations?		No Provisions
20. Investigation reports into deaths
	Are publicly available?	No Provisions
	Give reasons for the conclusions they have reached?	No Provisions
	Is this a legal requirement?	Partial, Medium
	Can such information be requested from the authorities when not publicly available?	Partial, Medium
	If one can request it, what is the likelihood this information would be released?	No Provisions
21. Is there information available on legal proceedings against agents / officials, pursuant to deaths?		Limited, Poor
22. Is there information available on legal proceedings against state agencies, pursuant to deaths?		Limited, Poor
23. Is there information available on disciplinary proceedings against agents/ officials, pursuant to deaths?		No Provisions
24. Number of prosecutions against agents / officials involved in the last ten years?		Data unavailable
25. Number of convictions against agents / officials involved in the last ten years?		Data unavailable
26. Number of prosecutions against agencies involved in the last ten years?		Data unavailable
27. Number of convictions against agencies involved in the last ten years?		Data unavailable
28. Number of cases in which states have been found to have breached human rights law on the use of lethal force?		12 cases condemned by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights

Detailed elaboration

Data collection and publication by official agencies

The Ministry of Popular Power for Internal Relations, Justice, and Peace (MIJ⁸), whose hierarchical superiors in ascending order are the Vice President and the President of the Republic, is the governing body of the police service in the country⁹. Under its command are the Bolivarian National Police (PNB) and the Scientific, Penal, and Criminal Investigations Corps (CICPC). The latter’s responsibilities include the preparation of crime statistics¹⁰ — information that is processed and administered by the Venezuelan Observatory of Citizen Security. Consequently, the MIJ is the main official source of information on police matters. Subsidiarily, the Attorney-General’s Office (MP), one of the main external control bodies of the police forces, is the second official source of information on this matter¹¹.

In police matters, the Organic Law of the Police Service and the Bolivarian National Police Corps (LOSPCPNB) establishes general principles on accountability for police performance (Articles 9 and 77). However, in reality, crime and police figures have not been publicly accessible in Venezuela since approximately 2005¹². When reviewing the official websites of the competent institutions and then physically going to the corresponding institutions to formally request the information, it was found that they lack reports, reports, and statistics that allow citizens to know their handling of both matters in general, as well as on the use of force more specifically.

Regarding the publication of information on the use of force as a legal requirement, there are the Standards and principles for the Progressive and Differentiated Use of Police Force by officials of police forces in their various territorial political spheres¹³, which are of an administrative and sublegal nature. Article 6 establishes:

Episodes that involve the use of the scale of progressive and differentiated use of the police force in which physical contact occurs will require a written and detailed report from the police officer who applied it, which will be submitted to the consideration of the supervisor indicated in the corresponding Manual. The Police Forces in the different territorial political areas will prepare an annual report on the most frequent situations and the most used levels of physical force, in order to determine constant patterns or trends and adopt the corrective measures that may arise.

However, in the fourteen years that this rule was enforced, no public report of this nature has been known.

The last year in which there is some official information on the use of force is 2018, and it is available indirectly through the Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) published in June 2019¹⁴. That year, 5287 people died due to the intervention of public forces, which represented 33% of all homicides that occurred in the country. This report had a great international impact. One of the consequences of this publication was that, in the following years, the government no longer published the figures of deaths due to intervention by public forces, nor did it report any more to the OHCHR.

Data quality of official sources

As noted in the previous section, there are no known public official reports on the use of force in the country. The management reports available from the MIJ and the MP —which correspond to periods prior to 2017— are mainly concentrated on budgetary and infrastructure aspects. They construct their own bureaucratic indicators, sometimes in response to specific national circumstances. Data on known crimes is usually not disaggregated. These are fundamental data for the analysis of substantive processes both for the MP, and for the operation of institutions of the MIJ, as well as your subordinate bodies including the CICPC and the PNB. The way information is offered is unstable and changes from one report to another. They do not have continuity in their indicators, and content and methodology are not usually explained¹⁵.

The most recent information on deaths due to intervention by public forces that we obtained between 2010 and 2018 is limited to the figures that have been extracted from speeches by the institutional representatives of the MIJ and the MP, without reports or documents that support them or other details that allow their verification. These statements do not explain the methodology applied, nor do they present disaggregated data or microdata. In the case of 2017, the Minister of the Interior only left a PowerPoint slide posted on his social networks for consultation of the official figures¹⁶, with the contrast of only one year compared to the previous one, which offers few elements for analysis. Furthermore, it does not honor the importance of this type of information for any country, especially in Venezuela, considering the country’s serious problems of institutional and criminal violence in recent years — the main expression of which being the country’s high homicide rates¹⁷.

These cases are usually officially identified as ‘resistance to authority’, which means that the institution already assumes in advance the legality of these deaths. This category deserves a special mention:

Resistance to authority: Formally, they are a group of crimes established in Chapter VI of Title III of the Penal Code¹⁸ which cover various cases—ranging from threatening a public official or his or her relatives, disrupting meetings of public bodies, to opposing any official in the fulfillment of his duties (Articles 215 to 221). Under these generic assumptions, the CICPC administratively and at its discretion also groups together cases of deaths at the hands of State security forces (confrontations, extrajudicial executions, or executions), regardless of their legality or justification¹⁹.

Starting in 2012, the CICPC has refined this category into two large groups ‘with corpses’ and ‘without corpses’. In the first, there would only be deaths due to ‘resistance to authority’ which are what make up the aforementioned figures. With this, the National Executive intends to reduce the total homicide rate, excluding from this count ‘deaths due to resistance to authority’²⁰. In the words of the Minister of the Interior for the year 2017:

We exclude or separate from the crimes of homicide what we call resistance to authority, because in its international classification, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime excludes death by legal intervention, which means death of a criminal by security agents²¹.

Omitting information on deaths at the hands of State security forces within the total homicide figures is not only a makeup of the total figures. Rather, it is the concealment and naturalization of possible serious violations of human rights, and consequently, its tolerance and promotion²². Especially when the percentage of deaths due to the intervention of public forces in homicides is increasing —reaching as high as a third of total homicides— as has already been pointed out.

Data analysis and lessons learned

According to the information available until 2017, there does not seem to be any process of public analysis of the data by official organizations that creates new procedures or ways to improve. Beyond the propaganda used to convey to the population that crime has decreased or present figures of increase in police force, there does not seem to be an evidence-based policy. Only within the framework of the police reform process carried out between 2006 and 2009, and its attempted implementation until 2014, were public policy design processes based on previous research. Attempts were also made to create advisory spaces for policies in police matters such as the General Police Council²³. But with the increase in political conflict, the worsening of the multidimensional crisis, and the logic of a state of exception imposed by the government in the country²⁴, opacity of information, secrecy, and lack of accountability has been the rule.

Within the framework of the aforementioned reform process, for example, it had been considered to go beyond the internal and external controls of the police —which considered specific individual cases— and try to establish standards, early warning mechanisms, and development of good police practices in order to become benchmarks for the evaluation of police performance. Contributing to its adaptation to the legal framework and social demands, institutional spaces and procedures were normatively designed for these purposes between 2010 and 2011. However, after four years and the management of the same number of Ministers, in 2015, these regulations —which incorporated new developments in disciplinary matters— were modified to establish new the old system with its traditional and questioned inspectorates. Additionally re-established were regulations similar to those that existed in times before the reform²⁵.

Given the lack of information in our case, from the Monitor of the Use of Lethal Force in Venezuela (MUFLVEN), we carry out daily monitoring of these cases recorded in the news from 2016 to the present. At the time of writing these lines, we have systematized more than 14,400 deaths due to intervention by public forces²⁶. However, what we managed to collect is a underreporting. There is an express approach from the MIJ, according to which only the statistics offered by the Venezuelan Citizen Security Observatory have any validity. However, this organization has not published any information since its existence.

Investigations by official agencies

Regulation of the use of force

Venezuela not only distances itself, but also most of the time contradicts what is reflected in its own legislation. It is a clear manifestation of a Dual State²⁷. If the traditional hierarchical order of the regulatory block is followed, the use of force is regulated first in the CRBV, which is advanced in matters of human rights and citizen security.

It is essential to highlight that the CRBV establishes life and the preeminence of human rights as the highest value of the legal system and the actions of the State (Article 2). According to the CRBV, “the right to life is inviolable. No law may establish the death penalty, nor any authority apply it”. The State is obliged to protect “the lives of people who are deprived of their liberty, performing military or civil service, or subject to its authority in any other way” (Article 43).

This mandate directs the regulation of the use of force, which is mainly enshrined in the Organic Law of the Police Service and National Bolivarian Police Corps (LOSPCPNB). This law dedicates an entire chapter, between its Articles 68 to 72, to the guiding principles of the use of force for all the country’s security forces that carry out police work. This chapter is developed in the Norms and principles for the Progressive and Differentiated Use of the Police Force by officials of the police forces in their various territorial political spheres (NUPDFP)²⁸.

Thus, normatively, the police force is guided in every case by the affirmation of life as a supreme value. For these purposes, it must be applied in a necessary, progressive, and differentiated manner (Article 1 of the NUPDFP):

… based exclusively on the level of resistance and opposition that the person manifests to prevent, hinder or enervate a police intervention, reducing the use of physical force to the minimum required for effective containment, reducing the probability of producing injuries or damage, whether physical or moral, based on the principles of legality, necessity, and proportionality.

These regulatory instruments establish seven differentiated and progressive levels of the use of police force, which act in correspondence with the level of resistance and opposition of the citizen. It begins at minimum levels with mere police presence until reaching the last level —extraordinary, exceptional— signifying potentially deadly force (Article 3 NUPDFP). This last resort is only justified when the conditions of self-defense or state of necessity, established in the Penal Code, are met. These standards also indicate what supervision and subsequent accountability should be like, which involves among others: Leaving the proper record in reports that must be presented later. In addition, the standards emphasize proper training, ongoing training, and the importance of adequate equipment in this matter (Articles 4, 6 and 8 NUPFDFP).

How does the State investigate and legally punish the violation of the right to life by public forces?

In cases of extrajudicial executions, the legal classification would be qualified malicious homicide, aggravated by abuse of the weapons of authority or use of any other means that weakens the defense of the offended party²⁹, in ideal competition with breach of Conventions or Treaties celebrated by the Republic³⁰. The sentence would range between 17 years and six months and 20 years, approximately 18 years and nine months in prison.

The direction of the investigation of these cases must be carried out by the MP, a formally autonomous and independent institution³¹, a member of the Citizen Power (articles 284 and 285 CRBV). However, the MP relies technically and operationally on the CICPC, which —paradoxically and historically— has been singled out as the most lethal security body in the country³². Its officials end up being the investigators of cases in which their own colleagues are involved, which generates a clear conflict of interest.

When analyzing the little official information available until 2018, the impunity of these cases is almost absolute, and the information that the government itself gave to the OHCHR is very clear³³. Between 2017 and the first quarter of 2020, there were 4,890 cases of homicides committed by officials. Of these, only 13 went to trial (0.3%), and in only 1 have they convicted a person (0.02%). If this estimate was made taking as reference the more than 16 thousand cases that occurred during this period³⁴, the results would be even more dramatic. Victim organizations with whom we work directly confirm that what characterizes these cases is mistreatment, criminalization against people and their families, revictimization, impunity, and the lack of institutional response³⁵.

In response to this report, on February 25, 2021, the FGR verbally highlighted to the media, without any publicly accessible document where the details of this information can be compared or seen, that between 2017 and 2020, 677 alleged perpetrators have been charged of human rights violations for the crimes of homicide, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, illegitimate deprivation of liberty, violation of home, among others; imprisoned 519; charged 1,019; and sentenced to 171³⁶. Eight months and 10 days earlier he had given similar figures³⁷. In the period between both statements, they charged 137 officials, accused 233, and detained 93. These are procedurally difficult accounts to understand, especially because they have more accusations than imputations, considering that the latter constitute the first step to begin an investigation with an identified active subject, which would eventually lead to an accusation. Therefore, logically and chronologically, the number imputations should always be greater than the number of accusations. However, it is observed that between both statements the accusations were three times greater than the imputations. In this period, despite the indicated increases, the number of convictions remained practically unchanged.

In general, this information is too imprecise and fragmentary to be able to make any measurement on impunity regarding homicides committed by security force officials. First, this is because it does not report all of these cases known to the system, nor does it present each type of crime separately. Secondly, the aforementioned actions of the MP are not discriminated by crime. Rather, they are the sum of the institutional response to at least six crimes, which are different from homicides committed by State security forces. Third, they are not discriminated by year. Finally, because the procedural results of a case are unlikely to appear in the same year as the event occurred, much more detailed information would be needed to be able to make minimally logical, credible, and verifiable measurements.

Within the framework of its powers, the MP should present these figures broken down by type of crime and by date. They should indicate how many of these actions actually correspond to homicides committed by officials, in what years the cases in which the referred actions are being carried out occurred, how many cases occurred during that period, and what the institutional response has been. Only then could the levels of impunity be seriously and objectively measured.

If we add to all of the above that between 2017 and 2020 at least 16,000 deaths occurred at the hands of State security forces, these figures on the MP’s institutional response are evidently precarious. This is not only because of their imprecision and lack of detail, but also because of what their absolute numbers could signify with respect to this type of crime (homicides). This is finally confirmed, clearly and forcefully, by the testimonies and complaints of the relatives of the young people executed by the police — in whose cases the rule is the absence of response and institutional mistreatment, complicity of prosecutors, impediments to access to the file, the criminalization of the deceased, and the freedom of the perpetrators who remain in the exercise of their functions. In short: impunity.

In conversations with relatives of victims of executions, it has been verified that the wait for an institutional response can last up to more than 17 years. None of the cases known to the families of the victims have prisoners, accused, or convicted, and they never pass the first phases of investigation³⁸. As confirmed by the United Nations Independent Fact-Finding Mission for Venezuela:

The investigation of violations of the right to life must be initiated ex officio. Failure to properly investigate cases of death following the use of force may itself constitute a violation of the right to life³⁹.

Legal proceedings, prosecutions and convictions

It is noteworthy that, traditionally, information regarding the institutional response in cases of deaths at the hands of security forces is scarce. If it even exists, it is very limited. The MP’s annual reports usually present fragmentary data, coming from questionable methodologies —which are also not sustained over time— and change regularly even within the same administration. This has already been studied in the history of its annual reports⁴⁰. In a detailed analysis carried out by González et al.⁴¹, over a period of 19 years (2000–2018), only in seven years (2001–2002 and 2004–2008) were cases reported of homicides committed by security force officials. Clear increases could be seen. However, the number of officials deprived of liberty decreased, which shows the granting of procedural benefits in serious human rights violations (p.66). The most complete data could be obtained only between the years 2006 and 2007, where a total of 708 cases (799 victims) were counted; in that period, only 65 officials were convicted for these events.

If for each case there should be at least one person arrested or convicted for these events within the same period, this would barely represent 9% of the institutional response by the justice system. If the exercise is carried out with the data available in the MP’s Annual Report for 2005, which presents a cumulative total between 2000 and 2005, impunity in that period would be between 95% (5% deprived of liberty) and 98% (1.77% of convicted)⁴².

Currently, the cases of deaths at the hands of the State security forces have increased at least four times compared to those years. Complaints from the victims’ relatives, official speeches and policies on this matter, as like as comparative studies, they provide sufficient objective elements to affirm that these levels of impunity have not decreased and have possibly also increased. The various mechanisms of impunity, denounced for decades by various sectors, remain intact. This is confirmed by the OHCHR reports:⁴³:

Institutions responsible for the protection of human rights, such as the Attorney General’s Office, judges, and the Ombudsman’s Office, generally do not carry out prompt, effective, exhaustive, independent, impartial, and transparent investigations into right human rights violations and other crimes committed by state actors. They do not bring those responsible to justice, nor do they protect victims and witnesses. Such inaction contributes to impunity and repetition of violations. [p.7]

The Attorney General’s Office has regularly failed to fulfill its obligation to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the events, and the Ombudsman has remained silent regarding human rights violations. None of these institutions, nor the Government or the police, provide protection to victims and witnesses of human rights violations. [p. 12]

Cases in which the State has been convicted of abuse of lethal force

The Venezuelan state has been condemned by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IAC Court) for abuse of lethal force in at least 12 cases for events that occurred between 1988 and 2004. The corresponding sentences have been published between 1996 and 2021. It is possible that the number of cases and sentences is not greater because the Venezuelan State ceased to be under the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court since September 10, 2013⁴⁴, it and withdrew its membership from the Organization of American States in April 2019 — formally abandoning the inter-American human rights system⁴⁵.

Table: Sentences of the Inter-American Court against the Venezuelan state for abuse of lethal force

Case	Year of incident(s)	Year of sentence
The Amparo	1988	1996
The Caracazo	1989	1999
Montero Aranguren and others (Catia Retention)	1992	2006
Barrios Family	1998–2004	2011
Uzcategui and others	2001	2012
Castillo González and othersa	2003	2012
Landaeta Mejías Brothers and others	1996	2014
Ortiz et al.b	1998	2017
Díaz Loreto and others	2003	2019
Olivares Muñoz and others	2003	2020
Guerrero, Molina and others	2003	2021
González et al.	1998	2021

Non-official sources

In Venezuela, there are four organizations that monitor cases of deaths due to intervention by public forces, all of which have cases recorded in the media as their main source⁴⁹.

The first is PROVEA⁵⁰, a human rights NGO that has been doing monitoring work since 1989. However, this organization has had the criterion of only counting cases in which there is an express complaint of human rights violations, which means that they record a minimal portion of the total. Since 2020, in alliance with the Gumilla Center, they have launched the Lupa por la vida (“Magnifying glass for life”) initiative, in which they seem to have changed their methodology. However, they do not explain it or provide detailed information about their data⁵¹.

The second is the Victims Monitor, an eminently journalistic initiative, which began monitoring in mid-2017 and covers only the Caracas Metropolitan Area⁵².

The third is the Venezuelan Observatory of Violence (OVV, Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia)⁵³, which does not register or monitor cases but rather estimates and makes projections based on the history of official information available, based mainly on MIJ records which used to be the most complete in such cases.

Finally, the fourth is the Monitor of the Use of Lethal Force in Venezuela (MUFLVEN), which is in the hands of the authors of this report⁵⁴.

MULFVEN is an interdisciplinary effort that provides detailed information, investigations⁵⁵, and analysis⁵⁶ on the actions of the State security forces, with special emphasis on the deaths generated by their intervention. It is the result of a long journey of a line of work that, since 2016, has been developing,accumulating the most complete and detailed (unofficial) database on the use of lethal force in Venezuela by security forces of the State. Our registry includes both civilian victims and police officers who are victims of homicide.

We monitor and record daily cases of deaths due to intervention by State security forces published in the media, especially the digital portals of the MIJ and the MP, as well as 16 national and 34 regional newspapers (50 in total). In this way, we cover all the states of the country⁵⁷. Between January 1, 2016, and June 26, 2023, we have registered 14,326 deaths due to the intervention of public forces throughout the country. Detailed information on victims, georeferencing of cases and the security forces involved can be consulted directly on our portal⁵⁸. It should be noted that these cases that have been documented with this method barely manage to cover —approximately— 32% of those that are officially registered. This boundary has already been verified in previous works⁵⁹.

Part 3: Comparative indicators

I-1a. CK: Number of civilians killed by law enforcement agents on duty, by gunshot
I-1b. CKt: Number of civilians killed by law enforcement agents, regardless of means and whether or not on duty	5287
I-1c. CW: Number of civilians wounded by law enforcement agents on duty, by gunshot	Data unavailable
I-1d. CWt: Number of civilians wounded by law enforcement agents, whether or not on duty and regardless of means	Data unavailable
I-2. CK per 100000 inhabitants	16.6
I-3. CK per 1000 law enforcement agents	26.7
I-4. CK per 1000 arrests	56.6
I-5. CK per 1000 weapons seized	395.6
I-6. AK: Number of law enforcement officers unlawfully killed on duty by firearm	Data unavailable
I-6b. AKt: Number of law enforcement officers unlawfully killed, whether or not on duty and regardless of means	Data unavailable
I-7. AK per 1000 agents	Data unavailable
A1. Percentage of homicides due to state intervention	33.3
A2. Ratio between CK and AK	Data unavailable
A3. Civilian lethality index: Ratio between CK and CW	Data unavailable
A4. Lethality ratio: Ratio between Civilian lethality index and law enforcement agents lethality index	Data unavailable
A5. Average number of civilians killed by intentional gunshot, per incident	Data unavailable

Number of civilians killed and injured

Regarding indicator I-1, in July 2019, the OHCHR published its report on Venezuela, which contains official data that the State itself provided them. In section 50 of the report, it explains that “the authorities classify violent deaths resulting from security operations as ‘resistance to authority’”. The number of these deaths is unusually high. In 2018, the government recorded 5,287 deaths in that category⁶¹.

As mentioned, this report had a great international impact that made more difficult the automatic solidarity that left-wing governments —traditionally prone to the discourse of human rights protection— had been giving to the Venezuelan government. One of the consequences was that, in the following years, the government no longer reported the numbers of deaths due to intervention by public forces.

Regarding indicator I-2, according to official data provided by the government to the OHCHR and the population calculations estimated by the National Institute of Statistics (-Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas- INE), the rate of civilians killed by intervention of the public force per one hundred thousand inhabitants in 2018 was 16.6. It should be noted that the figures observed during the last six years show a statistic higher than the homicide rate of most countries in the world⁶². Without considering that these estimates are based on the population projections of the INE from the 2011 census —which does not take into account the mass exodus that the country has suffered in recent years— they overrepresent the current population and, consequently, underestimate the rates that emanate from these population estimates as references⁶³.

Regarding the I-3 indicator, access to information on the number of State security agents is difficult, as in other areas of Venezuelan public policy. There are only approximate numbers from the beginning of 2018 offered by an official spokesperson. They indicated that, as of February, there were “more than 184 thousand security forces officials” in the country⁶⁴. If we start from this number of officials and the official figure of 5,287 deaths due to intervention by public forces, in 2018, the approximate rate of civilian deaths per 1,000 State security agents in service would be 26.73.

With a similar effort, indicator I-4 was developed, since the opacity of official figures in Venezuela also covers people deprived of liberty. In the monitoring of official speeches carried out, a statement from the Director of the CICPC was obtained on November 4, 2018, which reported that so far this year this police force had detained 77,902 people⁶⁵. To try to obtain the figure for the entire year, we add to that amount twice the average number of monthly detainees, which is 15,580. This would correspond to the months of November and December: an estimated 93,482 people detained during the year 2018. Therefore, the number of civilians killed by public force intervention, would be 56.6 per 1,000 people detained.

Regarding the I-5 indicator, there is no disaggregated information that totals the number of firearms seized annually in the country. There is more propaganda information about the destruction of weapons than about their origins and characteristics. However, in the monitoring of official speeches, in the same statement used for the previous indicator, the Director of the CICPC reported that between January and November 4, 2018, the organization had seized 11,137 firearms⁶⁶. To try to obtain the figure for the entire year, we add to that amount twice the average number of monthly weapons seized, which is 2,228. This resulted in an estimated 13,365 weapons seized during 2018, which would result in 396 civilian deaths due to intervention of the public force for every 1,000 weapons seized. In this exercise, the problems that were experienced with the I-4 indicator —possible underestimation of the absolute numbers and overestimation of the rate— would be carried over again.

Number of law enforcement officers killed and injured

For indicators I-6 and I-7, no type of official information was obtained.

Indicators of use and abuse

There was only official information for Indicator A-1 that comes from the OHCHR report⁶⁷. For the rest of the indicators, no official information was found in any way or format.

Summary and recommendations

In Venezuela, for any list of recommendations on this matter to make sense, a Social State of Law must preexist with minimal democratic legitimacy, balance of powers, autonomous and independent justice institutions, and political opposition. Although no real State fully meets these conditions, the Venezuelan case is quite far from these goals. Without a prior political solution to this democratic deficit, the materialization of recommendations —sometimes eminently technical— is difficult to achieve. Without political and institutional conditions, these attempts at sectoral recipe books could be perceived as decontextualized or statements of good wishes. The solution to creating those conditions lies far beyond this modest report.

Regarding legislation, it has already been stated that Venezuela has an advanced regulatory block on police matters and the use of force but that it is not applied or made effective in reality or institutionally. In the case of Venezuela, the problem nor the solution is normative or legal in nature; rather, it is institutional and political⁶⁸.

In general terms, the State must report on cases of deaths due to the intervention of public forces in detailed and freely accessible documents, with national totals broken down by States, municipalities, and parishes, with general information about the victims and the responsible state actors. Likewise, the investigations and judicial processes carried out on these cases must be accounted for. Sufficient power and autonomy to the external control bodies of the police must be given so that they carry out the corresponding legal and criminal responsibilities. The National Executive should not publicly encourage or promote the excessive and arbitrary use of lethal force; on the contrary, it should condemn these practices. Finally, the denunciation of the American Convention on Human Rights must be reversed, and the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Organization of American States must be recognized.

References, data sources and downloads

1 According to the Living Conditions Survey (ENCOVI 2023), prepared by the Institute of Economic and Social Research of the Andrés Bello Catholic University (UCAB), Venezuela has income poverty that reaches 81.5% of households, and a extreme poverty at 53.3%. It continues to lose population as a result of migration, a decrease in births and an increase in deaths. Although it has overcome the hyperinflation installed since 2017, it is still the most inflationary economy in the world. Available at: https://n9.cl/rmz76

2 T. Hernández, Del mal necesario al bien indeseable: operativos policiales y delincuencia en Venezuela (1958-1986). Caracas: Central University of Venezuela, 1989; “Los operativos «extraordinarios» en Venezuela: dos acercamientos reflexivos al problema”, Capítulo Criminológico, 14 (1986): 1-26; K. Ávila, Uso de la fuerza y derecho a la vida en Venezuela. Caracas: Provea, 2019. Available at: https://bit.ly/3inDJuU; " El FAES no depende de nadie". La muerte como divisa. Caracas: Provea, Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas de la UCV, REACIN, 2022. Available at: https://n9.cl/a1f67

3 K. Ávila, “Estado de excepción y necropolítica como marco de los operativos policiales en Venezuela”, Revista Crítica Penal y Poder, N°15 (2018):180-214. Available : https://bit.ly/3uuPKDV

4 K. Ávila, El FAES no depende…, Op. cit .; M. Penfold, How to reconstruct Venezuela: political conflict, weak state capacities, and social violence . Washington: Wilson Center, Latin American Program, 2021.

5 J. Magdaleno, “Por qué no se ha producido una transición a la democracia en Venezuela? Diez mitos sobre las transiciones a la democracia”, in Gratius, S. and Puente, J. (Coord.) Venezuela en la encrucijada. Radiografía de un colapso. Caracas: IESA-UCAB, 2020; M. López Maya, Democracia para Venezuela: ¿representativa, participativa o populista? Caracas: Grupo Alfa Editorial, 2021. According to the Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) of the Variations in Democracy (V-DEM) 2023 report, Venezuela appears in 161st place out of a total of 179 countries measured, with a substantial democratic deterioration in the last decade. Available at: https://n9.cl/kbr8w  

6 M. Penfold, Op. cit .; R. Diamint and L. Tedesco, “Los pilares de Maduro”, in Gratius, S. and Puente, J. (Coord.) Venezuela en la encrucijada. Radiografía de un colapso (Caracas: IESA-UCAB, 2020).

7 K. Ávila, El FAES no depende…, Op. cit.; Estado de excepción…, Op. cit.; “El estado de excepción como vida cotidiana: Remilitarización política y su impacto sobre la seguridad ciudadana en Venezuela”. In Dikaiosyne, Special Issue on Human Rights, No. 037, Year XXIV, 2022, pp. 38-69. Universidad de Los Andes, 2022. Available at: https://bit.ly/3AD8N3q

8 The official acronym would be “MPPRIJP” to simplify the text we will use the acronym “MIJ” corresponding to “Ministry of the Interior and Justice”.

9 Article 17 of the Organic Law of the Police Service and Bolivarian National Police Corps (LOSPCPNB, Ley Orgánica del Servicio de Policía y Cuerpo de Policía Nacional Bolivariana>).

10 Article 4.4 of the Organic Law of the Investigative Police Service, the Scientific, Criminal and Criminal Investigation Corps and the National Service of Medicine and Forensic Sciences (Ley Orgánica del Servicio de Policía de Investigación, el Cuerpo de Investigaciones Científicas, Penales y Criminalísticas y el Servicio Nacional de Medicina y Ciencias Forenses).

11 In a third place, data from the Ministry of Popular Power for Health could be considered, whose conceptual basis is in the International Classification of Diseases (ICD), where the category “death due to legal intervention” comes from, which is in itself problematic. Historically, their figures are usually well below those from the criminal records of the MIJ and the MP, which exceed them by more than double. These mortality yearbooks from the health source have not been published since 2013. K. Ávila, “Homicidios en Venezuela: principales debates y aproximaciones explicativas” Misión jurídica. Revista de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, No. 12, January-June, pp. 119-120, Colombia: Universidad Colegio Mayor de Cundinamarca, 2017. Available at: https://bit.ly/3kYt9MS; “Funcionarios de cuerpos de seguridad víctimas de homicidio: estudios de casos del Área Metropolitana de Caracas”. Desafíos, 28(II): 17-64. Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario, 2016. Available at: http://revistas.urosario.edu.co/index.php/desafios/article/view/5051/3446

12 Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia, ¿Descontando muertos? (Venezuela, 2016). Available at: https://n9.cl/3z514; Ávila, E. González, C. Jiménez, L. González, Visión panorámica del sistema policial en Venezuela 2000-2018. (Caracas: Acceso a la Justicia, 2019). Available at: https://n9.cl/lazom5

13 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Caracas: GO Nº 39, 390 of March 19, 2010.

14 OHCHR, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 2019. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/SP/NewsEvents/Pages/ DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24788&LangID=S

15 K. Ávila, et. al., Visión panorámica…, Op. cit.; E. González, K. Ávila, L. González, C. Jiménez, y T. López, Informe sobre el Desempeño del Ministerio Público 2000-2018. (Caracas: Acceso a la Justicia, 2020). Available at: https://n9.cl/nynlu

16 N. Reverol, Hemos logrado la reducción de la incidencia delictiva. Instagram, 2017. Available at: https://www.instagram.com/p/BdNyMWLnllS/  

17 70 per one hundred thousand inhabitants for the year 2016 according to the MP, 74 according to the MIJ. Ministerio Público. Informe Anual de Gestión 2016. Caracas, 2017; N. Reverol, Hemos logrado…, Op. cit.

18 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Penal Code (Código Penal). Caracas: GOE No. 5, 768 of April 13, 2005.

19 K. Ávila, “Homicidios en Venezuela…, Op. cit., pp. 119-120.

20 K. Ávila, ¿Cómo analizar las actuales cifras delictivas en Venezuela? International Amnesty. Venezuela, 2018. Available at: https://bit.ly/3myVid5

21 N. Reverol, Incidencia delictiva disminuyó en el país durante 2017. Available: https://n9.cl/x5p8o

22 A third definition is added to common homicides and “resistance to authority” which is “deaths under investigation” which ends up being a residual category in which the cause of the death, which was apparently violent, is not clear, which It makes the situation more complex, and allows officials to discretionally manage the registration of violent deaths in the country. It has even been pointed out that by 2022 “deaths under investigation” have increased. For more details: K. Ávila, “Homicidios en Venezuela…, Op. cit. Observatorio Venezolano de Violencia – Laboratorio de Ciencias Sociales. Informe Anual de Violencia 2022. Caracas, 2022.

23 On the future of police reform in Venezuela: K. Ávila, ¿Qué pasó con la reforma policial en Venezuela? Preguntas y respuestas básicas sobre el proceso en su etapa púber. Analysis for the Regional Security Cooperation Program of the Friedrich-Ebert- Stiftung (FES). Bogotá, 2019. Available at: https://bit.ly/3n8teOK

24 On how the state of exception has been imposed in the country: K. Ávila, El estado de excepción como vida cotidiana…Op. cit.

25 K. Ávila, , ¿Qué pasó con la reforma policial… Op. cit. pp. 10-11.

26 For more details consult: https://muflven.org/

27 In the sense that there is a design of the State in the Constitution and a political practice that contradicts and dismantles it. On the Dual State, see: E. Fraenkel, The Dual State. A contribution to the theory of dictatorship . New York: Oxford University Press, 1941; C. Schmitt, Teoría de la Constitución. Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1996.

28 Normas y principios para el Uso… Op. cit.

29 Article 77.8 of the Penal Code: increases the penalty from the average term to its upper limit.

30 Article 155.3 of the Penal Code: prison of 1 to 4 years.

31 But de facto controlled by the Executive Branch as well as the Judicial Branch.

32 Until 2019, the year in which he was displaced by the PNB, thanks to the prominence of its FAES division, something unprecedented in the last five decades. K. Ávila, Muertes por intervención de la fuerza pública en Venezuela, 2016-2019. Bogotá: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) and REACIN, 2021. Available at: https://bit.ly/3mhqX2n; "El FAES no depende de nadie”… Op. cit.

33 OHCHR, Results of the investigation of complaints of possible violations of the human rights to life, liberty and physical and moral integrity in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva: United Nations. Human Rights Council, 2020, p. 8.

34 4, 998 in 2017 (N. Reverol, Hemos logrado… Op. cit. ), 5, 287 in 2018 (OHCHR, Report of the High Commissioner… 2019, Op. cit. ), both according to official information; at least 3, 206 for 2019 and 2, 873 for 2020 according to our case monitoring, which represents under-reporting. For more details on the figures for 2019 onwards, consult: https://muflven.org/

35 The complaints can be seen on their social networks: @MadresPoderosas and @Orfavide. Especially through the hashtags #NosotrasTambiénQueremosJusticia #NoMásEjecuciones. Their testimonies can be read in the stories section of the MUFLVEN portal: https://muflven.org/historias/

36 T. Saab, Fiscal General de la República presentó ante la AN el informe de gestión 2017-2020. Venezolana de Televisión (VTV), 2021. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=odjGOMChM5Y&feature=youtu.be

37 T. Saab, Solicitan órdenes de aprehensión contra 2 jefes del FAES Zulia y 1 exfiscal por caso GuacamayaTV. VTV, 2020. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wSb7vcyd5zE&feature=youtu.be (1/2); https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QUkTP3PcPhc (2/2)

38 This entire section and the following one comes from: K. Ávila, “El FAES no depende de nadie”, Op. cit., pp. 63-71.

39 United Nations Independent Fact-Finding Mission for Venezuela, Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Human Rights Council, UN, 2020, p.8.

40 K. Ávila, Uso de la fuerza…, Op. cit.

41 E. González et al., Op. cit.

42 Ibid, p. 65; Fiscal General de la República, “Presentación del Fiscal General de la República”. Informe Anual a la Asamblea Nacional 2005. Tomo I. Caracas: Ministerio Público, 2006, p. 12.

43 OHCHR, Report of the High Commissioner… 2019, Op. cit.

44 In general, "full compliance with the 16 condemnatory sentences issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights between 1985 and 2012 is still pending, which have only been partially complied with and which contemplate, among other reparation measures, the payment of some 9.7 billion dollars in compensation for more than 250 victims” M. Primera, Venezuela abandona el sistema de derechos humanos interamericano. El País, 2013. Available at: https://elpais.com/internacional/2013/09/10/actualidad/1378780644_769381.html

45 L. Ojeda, Venezuela cesa membresía en la OEA este sábado: ¿Qué motivó esta decisión soberana? Popular Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Available at: https://n9.cl/s9kxj

46 In this case the agents were off duty.

47 The incident occurred during a military exercise.

48 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Jurisprudence . Available at: https://www.corteidh.or.cr/jurisprudencia-search.cfm

49 The press monitoring method is a consequence of censorship and the problem of access to official information, which has been characteristic of Latin American – and particularly Venezuelan – research on these topics for decades. K. Ávila, “El FAES no depende…, Op. cit., p. 25. Huggins, for three decades, has recognized these methodological efforts as “ingenious”. M. Huggins, Vigilantism and State in Modern Latin America. Essays on extralegal violence . New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991, p. ix.

50 https://provea.org/

51 https://lupaporlavida.org/

52 https://monitordevictimas.com/

53 https://observatoriodeviolencia.org.ve/

54 https://muflven.org/

55 https://muflven.org/investigacion/

56 https://muflven.org/analisis/

57 For more details: https://muflven.org/47-2/#quesomos

58 https://muflven.org/muflven/tabla_publica.php

59 K. Ávila, “Funcionarios de cuerpos de seguridad… Op. cit., p.32; Uso de la fuerza… Op. cit., p. 54; “ Venezuela” Monitor of Use of Lethal Force in Latin America and the Caribbean. Comparative Study of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela (2022), p.320. Available at: https://bit.ly/3K9h8PD

60 This entire section comes from the “Venezuela” chapter of the latest Monitor of Use of Lethal report. Force in Latin America and the Caribbean. Comparative _ Study of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela (2022). Available at: https://www.monitorfuerzaletal.com/docs/MonitorFuerzaLetal_2022_verA.pdf

61 OHCHR, Report of the High Commissioner… Op. cit., p. 11.

62 K. Ávila, Uso de la fuerza… Op. cit.; C. Silva, C. Pérez, I. Cano, y K. Ávila, “Análisis comparativo regional. Monitor Uso de la Fuerza Letal en América Latina”, Monitor del uso de la Fuerza Letal en América Latina: un estudio comparativo de Brasil, Colombia, El Salvador, México y Venezuela (México: CIDE, 2019). Available at: https://bit.ly/3a2KVbe

63 The INE estimates the population of Venezuela for the year 2018 at 31, 828, 110 people. These estimates are the ones taken as a reference to make the rate calculations, since they are official figures. However, it is important to note that these figures underestimate the exodus that the country has suffered in recent years. According to ENCOVI ( Op. cit ), currently our population has been reduced to 28.3 million.

64 N. Reverol, Dispositivo Carnavales Seguros 2018 garantiza retorno de temporadistas. (Caracas: MIJ, 2018). Available at: http://www.mpprijp.gob.ve/?p=52468

65 D. Rico, 77, 902 people detained by the CICPC during 2018 (Caracas: MIJ, 2018). Available at: http://www.mpprijp.gob.ve/?p=65108 2018. It should be noted that although the CICPC is the main body that generates crime statistics in the country, it is possible that this figure is an underreporting that is not considering the arrests carried out by the rest of the State security agencies. Consequently, the estimated rate could be overestimated.

66 D. Rico, Detenidas 77 mil 902 personas… (2018), Op. cit. As with the previous indicator, this figure represents an under-record since it possibly does not take into account the seizures carried out by the rest of the State security agencies.

67 OHCHR, Report of the High Commissioner… 2019, Op. cit.

68 For a detailed list of recommendations dedicated to Venezuela, see: K. Ávila, “Venezuela”, Op. cit. pp. 346-349; K. Ávila, ¿Qué pasó con la reforma policial en Venezuela?, Op. cit., pp. 13-14.